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Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent
Curtis A. Bradley* and Jack L. Goldsmith**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Article II of the Constitution grants the President the “Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”1 When the President obtains the
Senate’s consent and ratifies a treaty, the treaty binds the United States
internationally. If the treaty is “self-executing,”2 it also becomes part of
domestic federal law that supersedes prior inconsistent federal law (treaties and
statutes) as well as inconsistent state law.3
This constitutional treatymaking process was designed with a particular
type of treaty in mind. In the late eighteenth century, treaties were primarily
bilateral agreements that focused on inter-national relations such as trade and
peace. Nations entered into reciprocal relationships with other nations to
achieve mutual gain. For a variety of reasons, there was a relatively tight fit
between the pledges made in traditional treaties and the subsequent behavior of
the treaty parties. One reason was that the treaties concerned relatively narrow
and discrete matters between just a few countries; another reason was that
compliance with treaty language was induced by the reciprocal benefits that
the treaties conferred. In a very real sense, traditional treaties were
operational, not aspirational.
Many modern treaties are different. The differences are most
pronounced with respect to human rights treaties. These treaties regulate not
*

Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
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Professor, University of Chicago Law School.

For their helpful comments and suggestions, we thank John Manning, John Nagle,
John Setear, Adrian Vermeule, and participants in a faculty workshop held at the Notre Dame
Law School.
1

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

2

By self-executing, we mean enforceable in U.S. courts without implementing
legislation. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (distinguishing
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
3

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that treaties “shall be the
supreme Law of the Land” and that the “Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.” U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has long held that treaties supersede inconsistent state
law. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796). It also has held that when
there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the later in time prevails as a matter of
U.S. law. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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relations between nations, but rather intra-national relations between a nation
and its citizens. They are designed to govern the entire world community
rather than two or three nations. The variation in moral, political, and cultural
perspectives across nations makes agreement on the content of these treaties
difficult to reach. As a result, the language of these treaties is often vague and
open-ended. In addition, the treaties are not designed to confer specific
reciprocal benefits on the parties, but rather to effectuate forward-looking,
large-scale changes in values. It is thus no surprise that there is often a large
gap between the pledges made in these treaties and national behavior. These
treaties are largely aspirational, not operational.
Modern human rights treaties present several challenges for the U.S.
constitutional system. The first challenge concerns substance. Human rights
treaty provisions sometimes are in tension with either constitutionallyguaranteed rights (like the First Amendment) or well-settled and
democratically popular practices (such as capital punishment for heinous
crimes). United States treatymakers find it constitutionally or politically
difficult to consent to these treaty norms. The second challenge concerns
scope. Human rights treaties touch on almost every aspect of domestic civil,
political, and cultural life. The breadth and vagueness of the treaty norms
means that, if they are binding and self-executing, they have the potential to
upset settled domestic legal expectations. The third challenge concerns
structure. Structural constitutional principles relating to separation of powers
suggest that domestic federal law with respect to human rights should be made
through the lawmaking process that involves the House of Representatives. In
addition, constitutional principles of federalism suggest that some matters
should be regulated by state rather than federal officials.
For many years, these challenges led U.S. treaty-makers to decline to
ratify any of the major post-World War II human rights treaties. Beginning in
the 1970s, the treatymakers crafted a way to commit the United States to
human rights treaties on the international plane while accommodating domestic
constitutional concerns. They achieved these dual aims by ratifying the
treaties with a set of conditions. These conditions take the form of
reservations, understandings, and declarations – collectively, “RUDs” – to U.S.
ratification. The RUDs address each of the problems outlined above. With
regard to the problem of substance, the U.S. treatymakers decline to commit
the United States to certain substantive provisions in the treaties. With regard
to the problems of scope and structure, the treatymakers declare that the
treaties are not self-executing and thus not enforceable in U.S. courts until
implemented by Congressional legislation.
They also express an
understanding that some provisions of the treaties may be implemented by
state and local governments rather than the federal government.
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The dominant view among international law commentators is that the
RUDs are legally invalid, bad policy, or both.4 With respect to legal validity,
commentators argue, among other things, that the reservations violate
international law restrictions on treaty conditions; that the non-self-execution
declarations are inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution;
and that the federalism understandings are inconsistent with the national
government’s responsibility, under both domestic and international law, for
treaty violations. As for the policy desirability of the RUDs, commentators
have argued that they show disrespect for international law and, in the words
of Professor Louis Henkin, “threaten to undermine a half-century of efforts to
establish international human rights standards as international law.”5
To date, courts have given effect to the RUDs,6 but no court has
considered their validity in any detail. The practical significance of the issue
was illustrated recently in a death penalty case from Nevada. In that case, the
state of Nevada sentenced Michael Domingues to death for two murders
committed while he was sixteen years of age. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of sixteenyear-old offenders.7 Domingues nevertheless challenged his death sentence in
Nevada courts on the ground that it was inconsistent with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty ratified by the

4

See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1169 (1993);
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and
“Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515 (1991); Malvina Halberstam, United
States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 31 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 49 (1997); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341 (1995); Ved P.
Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders:
An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DePaul L.
Rev. 1311 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of NonSelf-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1257 (1993);
John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy
Clause, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1287 (1993); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The
Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 571 (1991); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 277 (1995);
David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn. L.
Rev. 35 (1978); Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations
that Treaty Provisions are Not Self-Executing, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 233 (1979).
5

Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 349.

6

See, e.g., Iguarta de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994); Ralk
v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d
943 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998); White v. Paulsen,
997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998); In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D.
Conn. 1997); Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998).
7

See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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United States in 1992.8 This treaty contains a provision prohibiting the
imposition of a death sentence for the commission of a crime under the age of
eighteen.9 When it ratified the treaty, however, the United States attached a
reservation stating that it did not consent to this provision, as well as a
declaration stating that the entire treaty was non-self-executing. Domingues’
contention was that these conditions were invalid and thus should be
disregarded by U.S. courts. Although the Nevada Supreme Court rejected this
argument,10 it did so with almost no analysis, and two dissenting opinions took
Domingues’ treaty argument seriously.11 The U.S. Supreme Court denied
Domingues’ petition for review, but only after requesting the views of the
Solicitor General.12 Arguments similar to those made by Domingues were
made recently in connection with executions scheduled in Alabama, Arkansas,
Texas and Virginia.13
This Article challenges the conventional academic wisdom concerning
both the legality and desirability of RUDs attached to human rights treaties. In
our view, the RUDs are a sensible accommodation of competing domestic and
international considerations. They serve as a bridge between isolationists who
want to preserve the United States’ sovereign prerogatives, and
internationalists who want the United States to increase its involvement in
international institutions – a political divide that has had a debilitating effect on
U.S. participation in international human rights regimes since World War II.
More importantly, the RUDs help reconcile fundamental changes in
international law with the requirements of the U.S. constitutional system. The
RUDs achieve these ends, we argue, in ways that are valid under both
international and domestic law.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part II describes the historical
background of the RUDs and their principal features. Part III shows that the
international law objections to the RUDs are questionable and that the
conclusion usually drawn from these objections – that the United States is
8

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter “ICCPR”].
9

See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 6, ¶ 5.

10

See Domingues v. State of Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998).

11

See id. at 1280-81 (dissenting opinions of Justices Springer and Rose).

12

The Solicitor General argued that the petition should be denied. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Domingues v. Nevada, No. 98-8327 (filed Oct. 4, 1999)
[hereinafter “Domingues brief”].
13

See United Press International, Texas Inmate Executed for Teen Murder, Jan. 25,
2000; Frank Green, Two Juvenile Offenders Face Execution; Gilmore, High Court Asked to
Spare Them, The Richmond Times Dispatch, January 10, 2000, at B-1; Ex Parte Pressley,
2000 Ala. LEXIS 30 (Jan. 28, 2000); McFarland v. State, 989 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1999). A
concurrence in a recent Alabama case also took the treaty argument seriously. See Ex Parte
Burgess, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 35 (Ala. Jan. 28, 2000) (Houston, J., concurring).
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bound by the human rights treaties as if it had never attached the RUDs – is
inconsistent with international law principles relating to state consent. Part IV
shows that, regardless of the legality of the RUDs under international law, they
are valid under domestic constitutional law and thus must be enforced by U.S.
courts. Part V discusses a variety of functional benefits – including benefits
for international human rights law – associated with the treatymakers’
conditional consent power.

II.

HISTORY, PURPOSES, AND CONTENT OF RUDs

This Part sets out the background needed to evaluate the validity of the
RUDs. Section A provides a brief history of conditional consent in the United
States from the Founding until World War II. Section B then explains how the
development of international human rights law after World War II led the U.S.
treatymakers to embrace the particular RUDs that are the focus of this Article.
Section C describes these RUDs in detail.
A.

A Brief History of Conditional Consent

The U.S. treatymaking process operates essentially as follows.14
Representatives of the President negotiate the terms of the treaty with foreign
nations, and the President or his representative signs the completed draft. The
President then transmits the treaty to the Senate for its consent. If the treaty
receives the required two-thirds vote, the Senate sends a resolution to the
President authorizing him to ratify the treaty. The President has the discretion
at this point to ratify or not ratify the treaty. Ratification is the act by which a
nation formally declares its intent to be bound by a treaty. When the President
signs the instrument of ratification and the Secretary of State affixes the Seal of
the United States, the U.S. ratification process is complete. Even at this point,
however, the United States is not bound by the terms of the treaty. The treaty
becomes binding on the United States when the instrument of ratification is
either exchanged (as is usually the process with respect to bilateral treaties) or
deposited at a specified place (as is usually the process with respect to
multilateral treaties).
Since the 1790s, the President and Senate have often proposed
conditions to U.S. ratification of a treaty during the process of Senate consent.
Indeed, approximately 15% of all Article II treaties since the Founding have
been ratified subject to conditions that require subsequent assent from other
treaty parties.15 The Senate has usually proposed these conditions, but
14

See Congressional Research Service, “Treaties and Other International Agreements:
The Role of the United States Senate,” A Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 75-120 (1993) [hereinafter “CRS Study”].
15

See Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19
Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 89, 91, 97 (1996).
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sometimes the President has as well. The treatymakers have used a variety of
labels for these conditions, including “amendment,” “reservation,”
“understanding,” “declaration,” and “proviso.”16 For purposes of this Article,
the three most important forms of conditional consent, whatever their label,
have been the power not to consent to particular treaty terms, the power to
consent to a treaty on the condition that it has no domestic force in the absence
of congressional legislation, and the power to take account of the United
States’ federal structure in negotiating and implementing a treaty.
Consider first the treatymakers’ power not to consent to particular
treaty terms. The President’s “Power . . . to make Treaties”17 clearly entails the
power to decline consent to particular treaty terms. Without the power to
condition consent on the negotiating partner’s acceptance of proposed terms,
the President would lack the power to negotiate. This is why the President has
since the beginning exercised the power to refuse to agree to particular treaty
terms. The President has always exercised plenary discretion in this regard,
and it has always been understood that he can decline to ratify a treaty for any
reason, even after the Senate has given its consent.18
The Senate too has always exercised the power not to consent to
particular treaty terms, but in a different way and for different reasons. The
Senate’s power to “consent” entails the power to block ratification of a treaty
by withholding its consent. Since the 1790s, this greater power to withhold
consent altogether has been viewed as including the lesser power to consent to
some provisions of the treaty but not others.19 The Senate’s exercise of this
power of conditional consent helps compensate for its loss of any substantial
“advice” role in the treaty process. Many of the Founders believed that the
advice function required presidential consultation with the Senate prior to his
negotiation and signing of a treaty.20 During the Washington administration,
this process proved unwieldy, and the President began to submit treaties to the

16

Under international law, treaty conditions, regardless of how they are labeled by
particular nations, are considered “reservations” if they “purport[] to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 2(1)(d)
[hereinafter “Vienna Convention”].
17

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

18

See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 184 (2d ed.

19

For early examples, see infra text accompanying notes 24-41.

1996).

20

See Ralston Hayden, The Senate and Treaties, 1789-1817, at 18-20 (1920). See
also Arthur Bestor, “Advice” From the Very Beginning, “Consent” When the End is Achieved,
83 Am. J. Int’l L. 718 (1989); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The
Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 Persp. in Am. Hist. 233, 257 (1984); Howard R.
Sklamberg, The Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitutional Role in
Treatymaking, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445 (1997).
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Senate without prior consultation.21 Since then, the Senate has not played a
substantial role in advising the President in connection with treaty
negotiations.22 Instead, in order to preserve its ability to influence treaty terms,
the Senate has exercised the right to condition its consent on amendments to
the negotiated treaty.23
The first example of such conditional consent by the Senate occurred in
connection with the Jay Treaty with Great Britain – the first treaty negotiated
by the United States after ratification of the Constitution.24 This treaty,
negotiated by John Jay in 1794, was designed to resolve a variety of
compensation, trade, and boundary disputes between the United States and
Great Britain. The treaty was controversial in the United States because of
concerns that the Washington administration had made too many concessions
to the British. A bare two-thirds of the Senate gave its consent to the treaty in
1795, but only on the condition that an article of the treaty reserving to Great
Britain the right to restrict trade between the United States and the British West
Indies be suspended.25 Britain accepted this condition without complaint, and
the treaty was ratified.26
21

See Hayden, supra note 20, at 11-106.

22

See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303,
reporters’ note 3 (1987) [hereinafter “Restatement (Third)”]. Although it generally has not had
a significant advice role in the treaty process, the Senate is sometimes involved in the treaty
process before and during the negotiation stage. The Senate sometimes proposes subjects for
treatymaking and approves treaty negotiators, and sometimes its members are part of the
negotiating team. See CRS Study, supra note 14, at 69-81.
23

As Ralston Hayden, an early twentieth century expert on the treaty power,
explained: “As the Senate ceased to be consulted as a real ‘council of advice,’ its activities in
that part of treaty-making known as the negotiation became less important. . . . The effect of
the change in procedure was to leave the President free to negotiate the sort of treaty to which
the necessities of the situation demanded and allowed, while the Senate retained a like freedom
to accept, to amend, or to reject the result of his efforts.” Hayden, supra note 20, at 104-05
(emphasis added). See also CRS Study, supra note 14, at 79; Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties,
Their Making and Enforcement 81 (2d ed. 1916); Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at
177-78.
24

See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8
Stat. 116. For an interesting discussion of the historical events surrounding the Jay Treaty, see
Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, ch. IX (1993).
25

The Senate had stated that it was consenting to the treaty “on condition that there be
added to the said treaty an article whereby it shall be agreed to suspend the operation of so
much of the 12th article as respects the trade which his said Majesty thereby consents may be
carried on between the United States and his islands in West Indies.” S. Res. of June 24, 1795,
1 S. Exec. J. 64.
26

See Hayden, supra note 20, at 87. The Senate also began attaching interpretive
conditions to its consent early in U.S. history. For example, in consenting to a 1796 treaty
between the United States and the Creek Indians, the Senate stated that articles in the treaty
allowing the federal government to establish military and trading posts in the Creeks’ territory
should not be construed to preempt rights Georgia had been claiming in this land. See id. at
99.
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A few years later, the Senate gave its consent to a treaty with Tunisia
on the condition that an article in the treaty be suspended and renegotiated, and
the article was in fact renegotiated prior to ratification.27 The Senate exercised
a similar conditional consent power in connection with an 1800 treaty between
the United States and France.28 The United States’ treaty partners did not
always respond favorably to the Senate’s conditions. In negotiating an 1803
boundary treaty with the United States, Great Britain would not accept the
amendment proposed by the Senate, and the treaty was never ratified.29 The
head of the British Foreign Office at that time criticized the United States’
conditional consent practice, calling it “new, unauthorized and not to be
sanctioned.”30 Great Britain similarly complained about conditions proposed
by the Senate in connection with an 1824 treaty concerning the African slave
trade.31 Over time, however, this practice became generally accepted by the
international community.32 The United States engaged in this practice in
connection with numerous treaties during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, generally without controversy, as did many of its treaty partners.33
The second type of conditional consent of importance to this Article is
the power to render the treaty without domestic force unless and until Congress
enacts implementing federal legislation. Although the particular “non-selfexecution” clauses attached to human rights treaties appear to be a modern

27

See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 28, 1797, U.S.-Tunis., T.S.
No. 360. The article in question provided for the imposition of customs duties to be paid by
citizens of each country upon goods carried into the other country. Among other things, the
Senate objected to this article on the ground that it violated most favored nation clauses in
treaties the United States had with other nations. See Hayden, supra note 20, at 109-10.
28

The Senate gave its consent on the conditions that one of the articles of the treaty be
expunged and that the operation of the treaty be limited to a period of eight years from the time
of the exchange of ratifications. See Hayden, supra note 20, at 121. This treaty was
subsequently ratified subject to the Senate’s conditions. See id. at 123-24.
29

The treaty was the King-Hawkesbury Convention. The proposed amendment
would have deleted an article of the treaty that the Senate was worried might interfere with
U.S. rights in the newly-purchased Louisiana Territory. See Hayden, supra note 20, at 145-56.
30

Hayden, supra note 20, at 150.

31

See V John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law § 748, at 200 (1906). In
response, the then-Secretary of State Henry Clay reminded Great Britain that the Senate’s
conditional consent power was a function of the constitutional division of the treaty power
between the President and Senate, and that this was something “that the government of the
United States has always communicated to the foreign powers with which it treats, and to none
more fully than to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.” Robert T. Devlin, The
Treaty Power Under the Constitution of the United States § 64, at 61-62 n.18 (1908).
32

See Hayden, supra note 20, at 156.

33

For examples, see David Hunter Miller, Reservations to Treaties (1919).
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phenomenon, there are at least two longstanding precursors to them.34 First, in
a number of instances in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S.
treatymakers consented to treaties on the condition that the treaties, or
particular articles in the treaties, would take effect only if and when Congress
passed legislation implementing them.35 These conditions were, in essence,
international non-self-execution clauses. They differed from the modern nonself-execution clauses in that they prevented the treaty provisions from binding
the United States until Congress acted, whereas the modern non-self-execution
clauses simply prevent the treaty provisions from being enforced in U.S. courts
until Congress acts. Nevertheless, these conditions were designed to
accomplish precisely the same goal as the modern non-self-execution clauses –
inclusion of the House of Representatives in the domestic implementation of
treaties.36
Second, in a number of instances dating back at least to the late 1800s,
the United States expressly reserved certain treaty implementation issues for
Congress. For example, the U.S. treatymakers included the following
provision in an 1899 treaty with Spain concerning the acquisition of Puerto
Rico and the Philippines: “The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress.”37 Similarly, the Senate consented to a 1920
treaty with Austria with the stipulation that the United States would not be
represented in or participate in any international body authorized by the treaty
34

Many of the following examples can be found in Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers
and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1151 (1956).
35

These conditions were especially common in connection with bilateral trade
agreements because of the concern that the Constitution might require that changes in U.S.
import duties originate in the House of Representatives. See Crandall, supra note 23, at 18399; 1 Westel W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States 558-60 (2d ed.
1929). For example, an 1854 trade treaty with Great Britain provided that it would not take
effect until the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament enacted “laws required to carry it into
operation.” Treaty with Great Britain concerning Canada, 10 Stat. 1089, 1092 (1854).
Similarly, a provision in an 1875 trade treaty with Hawaii stated that the treaty would not take
effect “until a law to carry it into operations shall have been passed by the Congress of the
United States of America.” Treaty with Hawaii, 19 Stat. 625, 627 (1875). And, in a 1902
trade treaty with Cuba, the Senate added an amendment stating that the Convention “shall not
take effect until the same shall have been approved by the Congress.” Commercial
Convention with Cuba, 33 Stat. 2136, 2143 (1903). The Supreme Court subsequently gave
effect to the Senate’s amendment of the Cuba treaty. See United States v. American Sugar
Co., 202 U.S. 563 (1906).
36
37

See Willoughby, supra note 35, at 559.

30 Stat. 1754, 1759 (1899). Several Supreme Court Justices expressly endorsed the
validity of this provision, see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 312-13 (1901) (White, J.,
concurring), and the entire Court referred to it approvingly in dicta, see Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904); see also Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176,
182 (1901) (Brown, J., concurring) (stating that there was “no doubt” that the U.S.
treatymakers could provide that customs relations between territories ceded by treaty and the
United States “should remain unchanged until legislation had been had upon the subject”).
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“unless and until an Act of Congress of the United States shall provide for such
representation or participation.”38
A third type of conditional consent of relevance to this article concerns
the United States’ federal structure of government. Throughout U.S. history,
the treatymakers have used their conditional consent powers to guard against
undue intrusions on state prerogatives. At times, they have limited the
substantive terms of treaties to protect state interests.39 At other times, they
have made treaties dependent on state law,40 or have expressly limited U.S.
treaty obligations to matters “within the jurisdiction” of the federal
government.41
In sum, since the beginning of the nation, the President and Senate have
attached a variety of conditions to their consent to treaties. No court has ever
invalidated these conditions and, in fact, the Supreme Court has referred to the
treatymakers’ conditional consent power approvingly in several decisions.42

38

42 Stat. 1946, 1949 (1921). A similar provision was included in a post-World War
I peace treaty with Germany. See 42 Stat. 1939, 1945 (1921). Another example of an early
twentieth century condition designed to limit a treaty’s domestic effect was a statement by the
Senate in consenting to a 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan that the treaty
“shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions” in a specified immigration
statute. See Miller, supra note 33, at 60-63.
39

See, e.g., Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making
Power, 22 Am. Hist. Rev. 566, 585 (1917) (explaining that, between 1830 and 1860, “the
Senate and the executive entertained grave and increasing doubts concerning their authority to
make treaties” concerning rights to real property and that “in every particular instance in which
conflict arose the treaty in question was amended to bring it more nearly in accord with the
states’ rights theory”).
40

See, e.g., Article VII of the Treaty of 1853 with France, 10 Stat. 992, 1 W. Malloy,
Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United
States of America and Other Powers 1776-1909, S. Doc. No. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. At 528,
531 (1910) (allowing French citizens to possess land equally with U.S. citizens “[i]n all states
of the Union whose existing laws permit it, so long at to the same extent as the said laws shall
remain in force” and promising that the President would “recommend to [other states] the
passage of such laws as may be necessary for conferring the right”).
41

See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 192 n.*; Henkin, Bricker, supra note

4, at 345.
42

In addition to the decisions cited supra notes 35, 37, see James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937) (noting that “it is familiar practice for the Senate to
accompany [its consent to treaties] with reservations”); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869)
(noting that the Senate is “not required to adopt or reject [a treaty] as a whole, but may modify
or amend it”); see also Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 183 (1901)
(Brown, J., concurring) (“The Senate . . . may refuse its ratification, or make such ratification
conditional upon the adoption of amendments to the treaty.”); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S.
353, 374-75 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Senate . . . may, in the form of a resolution,
give its consent [to a treaty] on the basis of conditions.”). The only judicial decision
suggesting limits on the conditional consent power is Power Authority of New York v. Federal
Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded with directions to
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Human Rights Treaties and the
Bricker Amendment Debates

Before World War II, international law regulated primarily interactions
among nations and did not contain extensive individual rights protections.43
Soon after the War, with the experience of the Holocaust and other atrocities
fresh in mind, the international community began to develop a comprehensive
body of international human rights law. The seeds of this human rights law
revolution were planted in the 1940s. The United Nations Charter, which
came into force in 1945, contained hortatory provisions concerning the
protection of human rights.44 Three years later, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide and opened it for national ratifications.45 That same year, the
General Assembly issued its officially non-binding but nonetheless influential
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.46 The Universal Declaration, which
aspired to be a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations,”47 contained broadly worded civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights. Immediately following the passage of the Declaration, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights began drafting a human rights
covenant that aimed to convert the non-binding provisions of the Declaration
into binding treaty obligations.48
United States officials played a prominent role in creating this
emerging international human rights law regime. Nonetheless, in the 1950s
there was an intense debate in the United States over whether and to what
dismiss as moot sub nom., 355 U.S. 64 (1957), discussed infra text accompanying notes 20917.
43

On the pre-World War II international law protections for human rights, see
Stephen Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy 73-126 (1999); Louis Henkin, International Law:
Politics and Values 169-73 (1995).
44

See United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, art. 1(3)
(stating that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion”); id., art. 55 (stating that the United Nations “shall promote . . . universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”); id., art. 56 (“All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the [United Nations]
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”).
45

Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

46

Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948) [hereinafter “Universal Declaration”].

47

Id.

48

This drafting process would eventually lead to the promulgation of two human
rights treaties – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
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extent the nation should participate in this regime.49 The main issue in the
debates concerned the domestic implications of ratifying the human rights
treaties. Many believed that the U.N. Charter’s human rights provisions gave
Congress a basis for enacting civil rights legislation otherwise beyond its
constitutional powers. This was a plausible belief in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, which held that, when implementing a
treaty, Congress is not subject to the federalism limitations applicable to the
exercise of its Article I powers.50 A related concern was that the Charter would
preempt state laws under the Supremacy Clause. This view was endorsed by a
California court and four Justices of the Supreme Court in their consideration
of the validity of a California alien land ownership statute.51 The potentially
self-executing nature of the Charter was particularly worrisome to some in this
early Cold War, anti-Communist period because the Universal Declaration,
including its very progressive provisions concerning economic, social, and
cultural rights,52 was described by its proponents as giving content to the vague
human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter.53
49

See generally Natalie Hevener Kaufman, Human Rights Treaties and the Senate
(1990); Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower’s
Political Leadership (1988); see also The International Bill of Rights (Louis Henkin, ed. 1981).
50

See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

51

The California statute prohibited certain aliens from acquiring land. In Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute violated the
equal protection clause. In concurrences, four Justices invoked the U.N. Charter in arguing
that the Court should have invalidated the statute on its face. Justices Black and Douglas
observed that, in light of Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, “[t]here are
additional reasons now why [the California] law stands as an obstacle to the free
accomplishment of our policy in the international field.” Id. at 649 (Black, J., concurring).
And Justices Murphy and Rutledge stated that the California statute’s “inconsistency with the
Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one more reason
why the statute must be condemned.” Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring). Subsequently, a
California District Court did exactly what these four Justices suggested, holding that the
human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter were part of the supreme law of the land that
preempted the California statute. See Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950). That aspect of the court’s holding was later reversed by the California Supreme Court,
Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), and all subsequent decisions have
held the Charter to be non-self-executing. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d
353, 363 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981); Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965). Concerns
similar to those generated by Oyama reappeared a few years later when the three dissenting
justices in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), suggested that the
United Nations Charter enhanced the President’s foreign affairs powers. See id. at 668-69; see
also Tananbaum, supra note 49, at 51-52.
52
The Declaration states, among other things, that “[e]veryone” has the right to
employment, to receive equal pay for equal work, to form and join trade unions, to have an
adequate standard of living, to obtain an education, and to participate in the cultural life of the
community.
53

For example, the lower court’s decision in Sei Fujii, see supra note 51, relied on the
Declaration in interpreting the meaning of the United Nations Charter. See 217 P.2d at 48788.
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A related event that triggered concerns in the United States about the
emerging international human rights law regime was President Truman’s
submission of the Genocide Convention to the Senate in 1948. Although the
United States had helped draft the Convention and supported an international
prohibition on genocide, many Senators (and others) worried about the
domestic consequences of ratifying the treaty. Many of the concerns related to
the Convention’s vague definition of “genocide.” For example, the
Convention defined it to include certain acts “committed with intent to
destroy” covered groups, including the act of causing “mental harm” to
members of covered groups.54 The unease over these provisions related to
their possible inconsistency with the First Amendment, their possible use as a
basis for prosecuting U.S. military officials abroad, and their possible use in
support of a claim that U.S. policies toward African Americans and Native
Americans constituted genocide.55 There was also a more general concern
about the erosion of U.S. sovereignty and independence.
These issues provoked debates in the 1950s over whether to amend the
Constitution to limit the U.S. treaty power.56 Along with leaders of the
American Bar Association, a key proponent of such an amendment was
Senator John Bricker of Ohio, and the various proposed amendments are
commonly referred to jointly as the “Bricker Amendment.” In general, the
proposed amendments were intended to preclude treaties from being selfexecuting and to make clear that treaties would not override the reserved
powers of the states. Some versions also would have restricted the use of
executive agreements. There was substantial consideration of these proposals
during the 1950s.57 One of the proposed amendments fell only one vote short
of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.58
To help defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower administration
made a commitment that it would not seek to become a party to any more
human rights treaties.59 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced during
the Bricker Amendment hearings in 1953 that the administration had no

54

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 2.
55

For a summary of the lengthy congressional hearings in which these and other
concerns were articulated, see Kaufman, supra note 49, at 42-59.
56

See generally Tananbaum, supra note 49.

57

See, e.g., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res.
43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 825 (1953)
[hereinafter “1953 Hearings”].
58

See 100 Cong. Rec. 2251 (1954); Tananbaum, supra note 49, at 180.

59

See Kaufman, supra note 49, at 104-05; Tananbaum, supra note 49, at 89, 199.
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intention of becoming a party to the then-proposed human rights treaties.60 In
1955, Dulles reaffirmed that “the United States will not sign or become a party
to the covenants on human rights, the convention on the political rights of
women, and certain other proposed multilateral agreements.”61 In the same
year, the State Department published a Circular stating, in obvious reference to
the Bricker Amendment debate, that “[t]reaties are not to be used as a device
for the purpose of effecting internal social changes or to try to circumvent the
constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially matters
of domestic concern.”62 For decades thereafter, presidents did not submit
major human rights treaties to the Senate (although they did continue to seek
ratification of the Genocide Convention).63
This reticence changed with the Carter administration, which submitted
four major human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978.64 Since that time, every
President has urged the Senate to consent to the ratification of major human
rights treaties, and the Senate has in fact ratified four such treaties.65 With
respect to the treaties to which the Senate has given its consent, there has been
a remarkable consensus across very different administrations and very different
Senates about both the desirability of ratifying these treaties and the need to
attach RUDs to the treaties, as a condition of ratification, to protect domestic
prerogatives.
As for the desirability of ratifying human rights treaties, presidents and
the Senate have agreed that a failure by the United States to ratify the major
human rights treaties would result in at least two foreign policy costs. First,
60

See 1953 Hearings, supra note 57. During these hearings, Executive Branch
officials also assured the Senate that it had the power to give its consent to human treaties on
the condition that they be non-self-executing. See id. at 922 (testimony of Attorney General
Brownell).
61

32 Dep’t of State Bull. 820, 822 (1955).

62

U.S. State Dep’t Circular No. 175, ¶ 2 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 Am. J. Int’l
L. 784 (1956).
63

The United States did ratify three less controversial human rights treaties between
the time of the Bricker Amendment controversy and the Carter administration: the
Supplementary Convention on Slavery, the Inter-American Convention on Granting of
Political Rights to Women, and the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women. See
Kaufman, supra note 49, at 119-27; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 39 n.45.
64

The four treaties were the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights. A year later, in 1980, the Carter Administration transmitted to the Senate the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
65

The four ratified treaties are the Genocide Convention, ratified in 1988, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified in 1992, the Convention Against
Torture, ratified in 1994, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified in 1994.
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non-ratification would preclude the United States from participating in the
treaty-related institutions that, in turn, influence the course of international
human rights law.66 Second, non-ratification would create a “troubling
complication” in U.S. diplomacy, namely, that the United States could not
credibly encourage other nations to embrace human rights norms if it had not
itself embraced these norms.67
Presidents and the Senate have also agreed, however, that the modern
human rights treaties implicate serious countervailing considerations,
reminiscent of the Bricker Amendment debates. These concerns are easiest to
see with the respect to the most ambitious of these treaties, the ICCPR. The
ICCPR contains dozens of vaguely worded rights guarantees that differ in
important linguistic details from the analogous guarantees under U.S. domestic
law.68 Some of these provisions arguably conflict with U.S. constitutional
guarantees.69 In addition, the ICCPR, if self-executing, would have the same
66

This concern was raised in connection with all of the four human rights treaties
eventually approved by the Senate. For representative statements across many administrations,
see Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Four Treaties Relating to Human
Rights, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 14, 1979), at 21 [hereinafter “1979 Hearings”] (testimony
of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher concerning ICCPR); Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Convention Against Torture, S. Hrg. 101-718, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1990), at 8 (written testimony of President Bush’s Legal Adviser to the State
Department, Abraham Sofaer); Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, The
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 99-2, at 2 (July 18, 1985) [hereinafter “Genocide Convention
Report”] (views of President Reagan and his U.N. Ambassador, Jeanne Kirkpatrick);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 2, 1994) [hereinafter “Race Convention Report”], at 9-19 (transmission
letter from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott concerning Race Convention).
67

See 1979 Hearings, supra note 66, at 21 (testimony of Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher).
68

For example, the ICCPR, among other things, bars “arbitrary arrest or detention,”
requires that anyone arrested “shall be promptly informed of any charges against him,”
protects against “arbitrary interference with . . . privacy, family, home or correspondence,”
guarantees that everyone “shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,”
requires that the law give “effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status,” guarantees the “equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights,” guarantees “the inherent right to life,” ensures that
“all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person,” guarantees the “right to hold opinions without
interference,” secures “the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and join trade unions,” prohibits “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,” and guarantees the “right of self-determination, including the right to freely
determine one’s political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”
69

See 1979 Hearings, supra note 66, at 30 (testimony of President Carter’s State
Department Legal Advisor, Roberts Owen); Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov.
21, 1991), at 15 [hereinafter “1991 Hearings”] (testimony of President Bush’s Assistant
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domestic effect as a congressional statute and thus would supersede
inconsistent state law and prior inconsistent federal legislation. Literally
hundreds of U.S. federal and state laws – ranging from essential civil rights
statutes like Title VII to rules of criminal procedure – would be open to
reconsideration and potential modification or invalidation by courts
interpreting the vague terms of the ICCPR. Even if courts ultimately decided
that each of the differently-worded provisions in the ICCPR did not require a
change in domestic law, there was concern that litigation of these issues would
be costly and would generate substantial legal uncertainty.70 These concerns
also arose, although on a narrower scale, for the other human rights treaties.
To address these concerns, President Carter and every subsequent
President have included proposed RUDs along with their submission of human
rights treaties to the Senate.71 The Senate has consented to, and the United
States has ratified, four of these treaties: the Genocide Convention, ratified in
1988; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
ratified in 1992; the Convention Against Torture, ratified in 1994; and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, also
ratified in 1994. The United States included RUDs in the ratification
instruments for each of these treaties as a condition of U.S. ratification.72 The
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Richard Schifter); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., at 4
(March 24, 1992) [hereinafter “ICCPR Report”].
70

See 1979 Hearings, supra note 66, at 40 (testimony of Jack Goldklang, Department
of Justice) (“If the treaties were directly enforceable in court, the court would have the difficult
job of trying to reconcile how these four treaties fit together with existing” U.S. law); cf. 1991
Hearings, at 15 (testimony of Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Richard Schifter) (stressing that ratification of treaty should not create
domestically enforceable private causes of action); ICCPR Report, supra note 69, at 4
(stressing that changes in U.S. law as a result of the treaty’s obligation should occur only
through the “normal legislative process”).
71

President Reagan proposed RUDs in submitting the Torture Convention and in
resubmitting the Genocide Convention; President Bush did the same in resubmitting the
Torture Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and President
Clinton proposed RUDs when he resubmitted the Race Convention. In addition, presidents
have proposed RUDs for several human rights treaties that the United States has signed but not
yet ratified, including the American Convention on Human Rights, see Message from the
President of the United States, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), the International Covenant on
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights, see Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. Exec. Docs. C, D, E and F, 95-2, at
viii-xi (1978), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
S. Exec. Rep. 103-38, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). President Carter was not the first to
propose conditions along with a human rights treaty. As early as 1950, understandings and
declarations had been proposed in connection with the Genocide Convention. See Kaufman,
supra note 49, at 206; see also id. at 197 (“Reservations have been a key component of human
rights treaties from the earliest consideration of the Genocide Convention.”).
72

See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 Cong. Rec.
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Senate usually consented to the RUDs in the form proposed by the President,
but sometimes the Senate modified them slightly or requested that the
President modify them.73
C.

An Overview of Modern RUDs

The RUDs are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing
requirements of U.S. law and to leave domestic implementation of the treaties
to Congress. They cover a variety of subjects and take a variety of forms. For
purposes of analysis, they can be grouped into five categories:
Substantive Reservations. Some of the RUDs are reservations pursuant
to which the United States declines to consent altogether to certain provisions
in the treaties. These reservations are very much the exception to the rule; for
each of the four human rights treaties under consideration, the United States
consented to a large majority of the provisions. Some of the substantive
reservations are based on potential conflicts between the treaty provisions and
U.S. constitutional rights. For example, because of First Amendment
concerns, the United States declined to agree to restrictions on hate speech in
the Race Convention “to the extent that [such speech is] protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.”74 Similarly, the United States
attached a reservation to its ratification of the ICCPR, stating that the ICCPR’s
restriction on propaganda for war and hate speech “does not authorize or
require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the
right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.”75
S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) [hereinafter “U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention”]; U.S.
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17492
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter “U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention”]; U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter “U.S. RUDs to ICCPR”];
U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 (daily ed. June 24,
1994) [hereinafter “U.S. RUDs to Race Convention”]. The text of these RUDs is available at
the University of Minnesota’s excellent human rights library website,
<www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html>.
73

The Reagan Administration’s proposed RUDs to the Torture Convention were
criticized by some Senators and human rights groups as being too restrictive. In light of this
criticism, as well as a special request from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Bush
Administration submitted a revised and less restrictive set of RUDs. See S. Exec. Rep. No.
101-30, Appendix A (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to Senator Pell); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 4
(August 30, 1990).
74
75

U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 72, ¶ I(1).

U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 72, ¶ I(1). With respect to the Genocide
Convention, the United States sought to protect First Amendment interests by attaching a
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Some substantive reservations are based not on a constitutional conflict
but rather on a policy disagreement with certain provisions of the treaties. For
example, the United States attached to its ratification of the ICCPR
reservations allowing it to impose criminal punishment consistent with the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, including capital punishment on
juvenile offenders, notwithstanding limitations on punishment in the ICCPR.76
It attached a similar reservation with respect to limitations on punishment in
the Torture Convention.77 It also attached a condition to its ratification of the
Race Convention making clear that it was not agreeing to eliminate the
public/private distinction in U.S. civil rights law.78
Interpretive Conditions. Some of the RUDs set forth the United States’
interpretation of vague treaty terms, thereby clarifying the scope of United
States consent. For example, Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR prohibit
discrimination not only on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, [and] birth,” but
also on the basis of any “other status.”79 The United States attached an
reservation stating that “[n]othing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other
action by the United States of American prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States.” U.S. RUDs to the Genocide Convention, supra note 72, ¶
I(2); see also Genocide Convention Report, supra note 66, at 21 (explaining that this
reservation was designed primarily to avoid conflict with First Amendment).
76

Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides that “Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on
pregnant women”; Article 7 provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” ICCPR, supra note 8, arts. 6(5) and 7. The
pertinent U.S. RUDs provided that “the United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant
woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age,” U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 72, ¶ I(2), and that “the United States considers
itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,” id. at ¶ I(3).
77

See U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note 72, at ¶ (1) (“[T]he United States
considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,’ only insofar as the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.”).
78
See U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 72, ¶ I(2) (“To the extent . . . that
the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private conduct [than are customarily the
subject of governmental regulation], the United States does not accept any obligation under
this Convention to enact legislation or take other measures under paragraph (1) of Article 2,
subparagraphs (1)(c) and (d) of Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 with respect to private
conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”)
79

ICCPR, supra note 8, arts. 2(1) and 26 (emphasis added).
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understanding stating that this open-ended and undefined prohibition on
discrimination did not preclude legal distinctions between persons “when such
distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective.”80 It also attached a reservation to its ratification of the Race
Convention stating that it did not interpret the Convention’s prohibition on
discrimination as applying to private conduct not customarily subject to
governmental regulation.81 Similarly, it attached a reservation to both the
ICCPR and the Torture Convention stating that the United States considers
itself bound by the prohibitions in those treaties on “cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment” only to the extent that such treatment or
punishment is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.82 The United States also
attached understandings to its ratification of the Genocide and Torture
Conventions clarifying the circumstances under which conduct will fall within
the vague terms of these treaties.83
Non-self-execution Declarations. The U.S. treatymakers also included
in their ratification of human rights treaties a declaration stating that the
substantive provisions of the treaties are not self-executing.84 This declaration
80

U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 72, ¶ II(1).

81

U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 72, ¶ I(2) (“To the extent. . . that the
Convention calls for a broader regulation of private conduct [than is customarily the subject of
governmental regulation], the United States does not accept any obligation under this
Convention to enact legislation or take other measures under paragraph (1) of Article 2,
subparagraphs (1)(c) and (d) of Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 with respect to private
conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”).
82

U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 72, ¶ I(3); U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention,
supra note 72, ¶ I(1). These reservations were in part a response to the European Court of
Human Rights’ 1989 decision in the Soering case, in which the Court held that a long wait on
death row would violate the European Convention on Human Rights’ prohibition on “inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.” See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1989); see also ICCPR Report, supra note 69, at 12; David P. Stewart, United States
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1183, 1193 (1993).
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The understanding attached to the Genocide Convention provides that the
requirement in the Convention of an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group as such” means “the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.” U.S. RUDs to
Genocide Convention, supra note 72, ¶ II(1). The understanding attached to the Torture
Convention provides, among other things, that “in order to constitute torture, an act must be
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain
or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm.” U.S. RUDs to Torture Convention, supra note
72, ¶ II(1)(a).
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A non-self-execution declaration was not attached to the Genocide Convention, but
the Senate did include a declaration stating that the President was not to deposit the U.S.
instrument of ratification until after Congress had enacted legislation implementing the treaty.
Furthermore, even the implementing legislation for the Convention, which makes genocide a
federal criminal offense, states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as . . . creating
any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any civil proceeding.”
18 U.S.C. § 1093.
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is designed to preclude the treaties from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the
absence of implementing legislation. The treatymakers gave several reasons
for this declaration. First, they believed that, taking into account the
substantive reservations and interpretive conditions, U.S. domestic laws and
remedies were adequate to meet U.S. obligations under the treaties.85 There
was thus no additional need for domestic implementation.86 Second, there was
concern that the treaty terms, although similar in substance to United States
law, were not identical in wording, and thus might have a destabilizing effect
on domestic rights protections if they were self-executing.87 Third, there was
disagreement about which treaty terms, if any, would be self-executing, and
the declaration was intended to provide an answer to this question in advance
of litigation.88 Finally, the treatymakers believed that if there was to be a
change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be done by
legislation with the participation of the House of Representatives.89
85

For the Senate’s views, see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep., 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 12 (Aug. 30,
1990) [hereinafter “Torture Convention Report”]; ICCPR Report, supra note 69, at 4, 10;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 103-29, at 4, 6 (1994) [hereinafter “Race Report”]; Genocide
Convention Report, supra note 66, at 15-16. For a representative administration view, see
Race Report, supra, at 25-26 (Clinton administration official explaining, in the context of the
Race Convention, that “[g]iven the extensive provisions already present in U.S. law, there is no
discernible need for the establishment of additional causes of action or new avenues of
litigation in order to enforce the essential requirements of the Convention”).
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An important caveat should be noted here with respect to the Torture and Genocide
Conventions. For both Conventions, the Senate insisted that the President not ratify the treaty
until Congress enacted legislation to bring United States’ domestic law into compliance with
the treaty. See Torture Convention Report, supra note 85, at 20; Genocide Convention Report,
supra note 66, at 26.
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For a representative statement, see 1979 Hearings, supra note 66, at 54-55 (State
Department memorandum) (“The Covenants and U.S. statutes, while embodying almost
identical rights, are not identical in wording. The purpose of the non-self-executing
declaration, therefore, is to prevent the subjection of fundamental rights to differing and
possible confusing standards of protection in our courts.”).
88

For example, the executive branch maintained that the ICCPR was in its entirety
non-self-executing by virtue of both Article 2(2), which provides that “each State party . . .
undertakes to take the necessary steps to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights in the present Covenant,” and the ICCPR’s official
annotation, which provides that “the obligation to give effect to the rights recognized in the
covenant would be carried out by States through the adoption of legislative or other measures.”
10 U.N. G.A.O.R. Annexes, Agenda Item 28, pt. 2, UN Doc. A/2929, p. 18 (1955). See 1979
Hearings, supra note 66, at 315 (memorandum of Roberts Owen, Legal Adviser to the State
Department). This view was challenged on the basis of other provisions of the ICCPR. See,
e.g., id. at 276-77 (statement of Oscar Schacter); id. at 287-88 (statement of Louis Henkin).
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For example, in defending such a declaration before the ICCPR’s Human Rights
Committee, the State Department explained that “the decision to make the treaty ‘non-selfexecuting’ reflects a strong preference, both within the Administration and in the Senate, not to
use the unicameral treaty power of the U.S. Constitution to effect direct changes in the
domestic law of the United States.” Statement by Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S.
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Federalism Understandings. The RUDs typically contain an
understanding or other statement relating to federalism. The RUDs to the
ICCPR, for example, contain the following understanding:
“That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government
shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end
that the competent authorities of the state or local governments
may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Covenant.”90
The Bush Administration explained that this understanding “serves to
emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance
of authority between the State and Federal governments or to use the
provisions of the Covenant to ‘federalize’ matters now within the competence
of the States.”91 And the Clinton Administration explained a similar
understanding attached to the Race Convention as follows: “There is no
disposition to preempt these state and local initiatives or to federalize the entire
range of anti-discriminatory actions through the exercise of the constitutional
treaty power. . . . In some areas, it would be inappropriate to do so.”92
ICJ Reservations. The RUDs, like the reservations of many other
countries, also typically decline to consent to “ICJ Clauses” in the human
rights treaties, pursuant to which claims under the treaties could be brought
against the United States in the International Court of Justice.93 The United
States attached a reservation to its ratification of the Genocide Convention, for
example, stating that “before any dispute to which the United States is a party
may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under
[Article IX of the Convention], the specific consent of the United States is

Department of State, to the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, USUN Press Release #49-(95)
(March 29, 1995).
90

U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 72, ¶ II(5).
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ICCPR Report, supra note 69, at 9.
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Race Report, supra note 85, at 24.
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Like many nations, the United States is not currently a party to the general
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It withdrew its consent to that
jurisdiction in 1985, after the Court held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought by
Nicaragua concerning alleged military activities conducted by the United States. See Barry E.
Carter & Philip R. Trimble, International Law 326 (3d ed. 1999).
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required in each case.”94 The U.S. treatymakers have explained that the ICJ
reservations are designed “to retain the ability of the United States to decline a
case which may be brought for frivolous or political reasons.”95 They also
have expressed the view that the reservations will not significantly affect the
resolution of disputes under the treaties “because the [ICJ] has not played an
important implementation role and because the Convention provides other
effective means . . . for dispute settlement.”96
These features of the RUDs are now standard practice by the U.S.
treatymakers. Their validity has been challenged under both international law
and U.S. domestic law. We consider the international law objections first.

III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Many legal scholars have argued that the RUDs are inconsistent with
international law governing treaty-making. In this Part, we explain why these
objections are questionable on their own terms. We also explain why the
conclusion usually drawn from the objections – that the United States is bound
by the human rights treaties as if it had never attached the RUDs – is
inconsistent with fundamental international law principles relating to state
consent.
We need to say a word at the outset about the sources of international
law relevant to this issue. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
the primary source of the international law objections to the RUDs.97
Unfortunately, the provisions of the Vienna Convention relating to reservations
are vaguely worded and have provoked disagreement among commentators
and inconsistent national interpretations.98 To make matters more uncertain,
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U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 72, ¶ I(1); see also U.S. RUDs to
Torture Convention, supra note 72, ¶ I(2); U.S. RUDs to Race Convention, supra note 72, ¶
I(3). The ICCPR does not contain an ICJ Clause.
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Race Report, supra note 85, at 8.
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Id. The International Court of Justice recently gave effect to one of the United
States’ ICJ reservations. In dismissing an action brought by Yugoslavia against the United
States for alleged genocide in connection with the Kosovo conflict, the Court noted that “the
Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations” and that “Yugoslavia did not object to
the United States reservation.” As a result, the Court concluded that “the said reservation had
the effect of excluding [the ICJ Clause] from the provisions of the Convention in force
between the Parties.” Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States
of America), ¶ 24 (June 2, 1999), available at <http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm>.
97

See Vienna Convention, supra note 16.

98
See Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on
Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties, 64 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 245 (1993); Catherine
Redgwell, Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment 24(52),
46 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 390 (1997).
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the United States has not even ratified the Vienna Convention. Many
commentators believe that the Convention’s terms are nonetheless fully
binding on the United States as customary international law, which is the body
of international law that “results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”99 While this claim is
almost certainly too broad,100 we will assume for present purposes, as have
Executive Branch officials, that the Convention generally reflects customary
international law.101
We now turn to the specific international law arguments made against
the RUDs. Where examples are needed, we will refer to the RUDs attached to
the U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights
(“ICPPR”), which have received the most attention and criticism.
A.

Three Minor Arguments

We begin with three prevalent, but relatively non-serious, international
law arguments. The first is that the RUDs are invalid under Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention because they, in effect, limit U.S. treaty obligations to the
existing requirements of domestic U.S. law.102 Article 27 provides that a
99

Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 102(2).
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Many provisions of the Vienna Convention, including the articles on reservations,
did not reflect customary international law when the treaty was drafted. See Ian Sinclair, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 10-25 (2d ed. 1984). Since that time, state practice
with respect to reservations to human rights treaties has been sporadic and inconsistent. See
Redgwell, Universality or Integrity?, supra note 98, at 269-78. Moreover, the criteria for
inferring customary international law binding on the United States from a non-ratified treaty
like the Vienna Convention are contested. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Austl. Y.B.
Int’l L. 82 (1992). In addition, well-settled U.S. practice departs from some provisions of the
Vienna Convention, most notably its provisions governing treaty interpretation. See
Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 325, cmt. g and reporters’ note 4; David J. Bederman,
Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 972 (1994). Finally, it is
unclear whether the customary international law reflected in the Vienna Convention can bind
the United States in a way that limits the Senate’s traditional powers with respect to the
international effect of U.S. treaties, since this general concern is a key reason that the Senate
has declined to consent to the Vienna Convention. See CRS Study, supra note 14, at 22-23;
Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States
Courts, 28 Va. J. Int’l L. 281, 295-301 (1988). As noted below, a customary international law
rule does not bind nations that have opted out of the rule during its formative stage. See infra
note 107.
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The typical Executive Branch formulation, as reflected in the government’s brief in
the Domingues case, is that the Vienna Convention “is generally considered to be consistent
with current treaty law and practice as recognized in the United States.” Domingues Brief,
supra note 12, at 8 n. 3. See also Restatement (Third), supra note 22, Part III, introductory note
at 145; Frankowska, supra note 100, at 298-99.
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See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 627; Schabas, supra note 4, at 27 & n.35;
Weisbrodt supra note 4, at 57. A related argument is that no reservations are allowed with
respect to the “non-derogable” provisions in the treaties. This argument is a non sequitur. The
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nation cannot “invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.” As this language makes clear, Article 27 prohibits
reliance on domestic law as an excuse for nonperformance of a treaty
obligation. It says nothing about reliance on domestic law as a justification for
not consenting to a treaty obligation in the first place. By its terms, then,
Article 27 has no bearing on the validity of the RUDs, which do not claim any
right of nonperformance by the United States with respect to treaty provisions
that it has ratified.
The second argument is more complicated, but no more persuasive. It
relies on two premises: first, that the treaty provisions with respect to which
the United States has adopted reservations are already binding on the United
States as a matter of customary international law; and, second, that it is not
permissible under international law for a nation to agree to a treaty but opt out
of provisions that are already binding on that nation under customary
international law.103 Neither premise is sound. As an initial matter, it is
unlikely that the provisions of the ICCPR with respect to which the United
States has attached reservations reflect binding customary international law.
To take what is probably the strongest example invoked by academic critics of
the RUDs, even if there is sufficient state practice to support a customary
international law ban on executing juvenile offenders, the United States has
almost certainly opted out of any such customary international law norm.104
More importantly, the argument incorrectly assumes that nations are
obligated, when they ratify a treaty, to accept all terms in the treaty that reflect
customary international law. There is no basis for such a rule. A reservation
ICCPR does state that some of its provisions are non-derogable – that is, that these provisions
may not be disregarded even in time of emergency. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 4(2). But
that statement simply describes the binding effect of the provisions once adopted. There is
nothing in the ICCPR, or in the concept of non-derogability, that requires nations to agree to
particular treaty provisions in the first place. Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment
24(52), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, ¶ 10 (1994) [hereinafter “General Comment
24(52)”] (noting that “there is no automatic correlation between reservations to non-derogable
provisions, and reservations which offend against the object and purpose of the Covenant”).
103

See General Comment 24(52), supra note 102, at ¶ 8; Schabas, supra note 4, at

308.
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It is well settled that a customary international law rule does not bind a nation that
has dissented from the rule during its formative stage. See Restatement (Third), supra note 22,
§ 102, cmt. d and reporters’ note 2. The United States, in its RUDs, communications with
international organizations, and other state practice, has actively dissented from the formation
of a customary international law rule outlawing the death penalty for juvenile offenders. See
Domingues Brief, supra note 12, at 15-17 (detailing various U.S. objections to such a rule of
customary international law). Numerous commentators have nonetheless argued that the
execution of juvenile offenders in the United States violates customary international law. See,
e.g., Joan F. Hartman, “Unusual” Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 655 (1983); Nanda, supra
note 4; David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates
International Human Rights Law, 3 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Poly. 339 (1988).
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to a treaty provision is not itself a violation of the provision. It is simply a
decision by the nation making the reservation not to bind itself to the treaty
regime, and its associated enforcement procedures, with respect to the
provision in question. No one claims that nations have an international law
obligation to bind themselves to such treaty regimes and procedures. It is not
argued, for example, that the United States would have violated customary
international law if it had declined to ratify the ICCPR altogether. Nor is it
argued that the United States is in violation of international law for having
declined to ratify the Vienna Convention, even though there is widespread
agreement that at least some of its terms reflect customary international law.
Since it is clear that nations can refuse to ratify a treaty with terms that are
reflective of customary international law, it is difficult to understand how or
why international law would obligate them, when they do ratify the treaty, to
accept the treaty in its entirety. Finally, given the amorphous nature of
customary international law, it will often be difficult for nations even to know
when they ratify a treaty whether a particular provision is reflective of
customary international law.105 A rule that outlawed reservations to all treaty
terms reflective of customary international law would thus create substantial
uncertainty about the validity of treaty reservations and, more broadly, about
the status of treaty relationships.
The third argument is that that the RUDs are improper because they are
an attempt by the United States to ratify the treaties without undertaking any
obligations. As Professor Henkin explains, “[b]y adhering to human rights
conventions subject to these reservations, the United States, it is charged, is
pretending to assume international obligations but is in fact undertaking
nothing.”106 It is not clear exactly what the legal claim is here. The claim
cannot be that the United States has pledged insufficient “consideration” in
entering into these treaty commitments, since it is well settled that, unlike U.S.
contract law, the international law governing treaties does not require
consideration.107 Perhaps the argument is simply that the RUDs violate a
general duty under international law to act in good faith. There is indeed an
international law principle relating to good faith in the treaty context – pacta
sunt servanda. That principle, however, simply requires that nations act in
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See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 838-41
(1997).
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See, e.g., Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 344; see also, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note

4, at 1179.
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See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(1)(a) (defining “treaty” simply as a
written “international agreement” governed by international law); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale Int. L.J. 1 (1999) (“[T]here is no
corresponding requirement [under treaty law] for consideration.”); Geoffrey R. Watson, The
Death of Treaty, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 781, 797 (1994) (“There has never been a doctrine of
consideration in treaty law . . . .”).
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good faith in complying with the treaty obligations they have accepted.108 The
pacta sunt servanda principle does not address any duty by nations to agree to
treaty obligations in the first place.
In any event, whatever its international law basis, the premise of the
argument – that the United States has not assumed any international
obligations under the human rights treaties – is false. For some of the treaties,
most notably the Genocide and Torture Conventions, the United States has
expressly changed its domestic law in order to comply with the treaty
obligations.109 For other treaties, such as the ICCPR, the United States has
maintained that its current human rights protections satisfy its treaty
obligations and has committed itself not to retreat from those protections. In
so doing, the United States has exposed itself to the argument that its current
law does not fully satisfy its treaty obligations, an argument that would not be
available if the United States had not made any international commitments.
The United States also has committed itself to comply with reporting
requirements under the treaties, and it has generally complied with these
requirements.110
B.

The “Object and Purpose” Argument

We now turn to an argument that has a more plausible premise but
draws a very implausible conclusion from that premise. The premise is that
the U.S. reservations to the ICCPR violate the treaty’s “object and purpose”
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See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”) (emphasis added).
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The United States enacted criminal legislation to implement both the Genocide
Convention and the Torture Convention. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
(torture). In addition, to “carry out obligations of the United States under the United Nations
Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights,” it
enacted a broad civil damages remedy for victims of torture – the Torture Victim Protection
Act. See 106 Stat. 73, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. And, in 1998, it changed its immigration law to
take account of Article 3 of the Torture Convention, which bars the return of a person to
another nation “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Moreover, the Clinton Administration
recently issued an Executive Order designed to promote Executive Branch compliance with the
various human rights treaties. See Executive Order 13107, Implementation of Human Rights
Treaties (Dec. 10, 1998).
110

Of the four major human rights treaties ratified by the United States, three (the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention) have reporting requirements. The
United States has submitted reports to the monitoring bodies associated with each of these
three treaties. See the website for the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights,
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. Like many nations, the United States has not submitted
every report that has been due and has not always submitted its reports on time. As of March
10, 2000, the United States was overdue on a total of five reports, which was less than the total
for many other nations. See id.
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and are therefore invalid under Article 19 of the Vienna Convention.111 As we
explain below, this premise is debatable but probably incorrect. The
conclusion from the premise is that the appropriate remedy for the Article 19
violation is that the United States is bound by all of the provisions of the
ICCPR, including provisions to which the RUDs expressly declined consent.
As we explain, there is no basis in international law for this conclusion.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth noting that the ICCPR’s
Human Rights Committee has embraced both the above premise and
conclusion. The Committee has no official power to resolve disputes or issue
binding legal interpretations. It is instead charged with receiving reports
submitted by nations under the ICCPR’s self-reporting provisions and issuing
any “comments” it deems appropriate. Nevertheless, it has controversially
declared itself to be the definitive interpreter of whether or not a reservation
satisfies the object and purpose test.112 And, in two documents, it has directly
or indirectly raised questions about the validity of the United States’ RUDs. In
1994, it issued a general comment concerning reservations to the ICCPR, in
which it expressed “particular concern” about “widely formulated reservations
which essentially render ineffective all Covenant rights which would require
any change in national law to ensure compliance with Covenant
obligations.”113 It also maintained in that comment that reservations
incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR should normally be
treated as severable, meaning that the treaty “will be operative for the reserving
party without the benefit of the reservation.”114 Then, in 1995, it issued a
comment specifically on United States human rights practices, in which it
asserted, without analysis, that the United States reservations with respect to
the death penalty violated the “object and purpose” of the ICCPR.115 In short,
the Human Rights Committee has effectively taken the position that the United
States is bound by the ICCPR’s death penalty provisions even though it
specifically declined to consent to them.
111

See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 599-603; Schabas, supra note 4, at
285; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 58; General Comment 24(52), supra note 102. Article 19 of
the Vienna Convention states in relevant part that reservations to a treaty are not allowed if
they are “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”
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See General Comment 24(52), supra note 102, ¶ 18.
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Id., ¶ 12.
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Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee, 53d Sess., 1413th mtg., UN Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 50, ¶ 14 (1995). Several U.S. officials defended the U.S. RUDs in hearings
before the Committee held in late March 1995. See Human Rights Committee, 53d Sess.,
Summary Record of the 1401st Meeting, CCPR/C/Sr. 1401 (Apr. 17, 1995) (March 29, 1995
hearings); Human Rights Committee, 53d Sess., Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting,
CCPR/C/Sr. 1405 (Apr. 24, 1995) (March 31, 1995 hearings). In the hearings, Conrad Harper,
the then-Legal Advisor to the State Department, explained that the death penalty had broad
popular support in the United States and that “it was not appropriate in [this] democratic
system to dismiss considered public opinion and impose by fiat a different view.”
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To analyze this claim, some background is necessary. Nations have
made reservations to treaties since the end of the eighteenth century.116
International law traditionally imposed strict requirements on when a state
could make a reservation and still be a party to a treaty. In a bilateral treaty, a
reservation was like a counter-offer; both parties to the treaty had to agree to
every reservation before the treaty became valid. For multilateral treaties, the
traditional rule was that a reserving state was not a party to a treaty unless
every other party to the treaty accepted the reservation.117 This traditional
unanimity rule was “based on the concept of the integrity of the terms of the
treaty which had been freely negotiated by the prospective parties, and it
provided an unambiguous answer to the question whether a State which had
submitted an instrument of ratification or accession, accompanied by a
reservation, had become a party to the treaty generally.”118
With the expansion of multilateral treaty-making after World War II,
the unanimity rule came under attack.119 There were increasing concerns that
the unanimity rule was insufficiently flexible and that it thwarted maximum
participation in multilateral treaties, especially human rights treaties. Such
flexibility was thought to be essential for the making of human rights treaties
among an increasingly large number of countries that were politically and
culturally diverse.120 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) embraced a
116

The Senate’s reservation to the Jay Treaty in 1794 was the first reservation to a
bilateral treaty; Sweden-Norway’s reservation to certain parts of the Final Act of the Vienna
Congress in 1815 was one of the first reservations to a multilateral treaty. See William W.
Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, II Receuil des Cours at 260-62 (1961). Reservations
were sporadic during the nineteenth century, but then picked up significantly at the dawn of the
twentieth century, beginning with the many reservations to the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions on the laws of war. See Frank Horn, Reservations and Declarations to
Multilateral Treaties 7 (1988). For statistics on the use of reservations from 1919 to 1971, see
John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State
Practice, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 372 (1980).
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See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at 55-56; Harvard Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 14-16, reprinted in 29 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 653
(1935).
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United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session,
A/CONF.39/11, at p.113, ¶ 71 (Sinclair); see also Reports of the International Law
Commission, 3d Session, [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 123, 129, UN Doc. A/1858 (1951).
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There was some movement away from the unanimity rule prior to World War II.
Most notably, a more flexible approach to conditions was adopted in connection with the Pan
American Union of the 1930s. See P.K. Menon, An Introduction to the Law of Treaties 34-35
(1992).
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For example, the representative at the Vienna Conference from the United
Kingdom, a nation that traditionally supported the unanimity rule, acknowledged that the rule
“might in modern times be a counsel of perfection, since it had been rendered less practicable
by the great expansion of the membership of the international community in recent years.”
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session,
A/CONF.39/11, at p.114, ¶ 72 (Sinclair).
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more flexible approach in its advisory opinion in Reservations to the Genocide
Convention.121 The ICJ reasoned that the aim of securing widespread
ratification of the Genocide Convention argued for greater flexibility with
regard to reservations. It explained that, with respect to such a treaty, “one
cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to states, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.”122
The ICJ therefore held that a reserving state could be a party to the Genocide
Convention even if some parties to the Convention objected to the reservation.
The ICJ made clear, however, that if a State makes a reservation incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, the State “cannot be
regarded as being a party to the Convention.”123
The Vienna Convention, which was opened for signature in 1969 and
entered into force in 1980, embraced a flexible approach to reservations similar
to the one outlined in the Genocide Convention decision.124 Article 19 of the
Convention allows a party to formulate a reservation to a treaty unless “the
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”125
Articles 20 and 21 then establish rules for acceptance or rejection of
reservations, and the consequences that follow from acceptance or rejection.
When a contracting nation accepts another nation’s reservation, the reserving
nation becomes a party to the treaty in relation to the accepting nation.126 A
reservation is deemed accepted by any nation that does not raise an objection
to the reservation within twelve months of notification.127 An objection to a
reservation does not preclude entry into force of the treaty between the
reserving and objecting nation unless the objecting state says so definitively;
rather, the provision to which the reservation relates is simply inapplicable
between the two states to the extent of the reservation.128 This flexible
approach, as the United Nations’ International Law Commission has explained,
is designed to encourage widespread participation in treaty regimes.129
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[1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15. The case came to the Court at the request of the United
Nations General Assembly.
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Id. at 23.
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Id. at 18.
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For a detailed historical account of the events between the Genocide Convention
case and the final wording of the Vienna Convention, including the initial criticism of the ICJ
decision and the eventual acceptance over the subsequent 20 years that a more flexible
approach was appropriate, see Redgwell, Universality or Integrity, supra note 98, at 250-62.
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Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 19. Article 19 also states that reservations
are permitted unless the treaty prohibits them or only authorizes reservations other than the
ones made. See id.
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See id., art. 20(4)(a).
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See id., art. 20(5).
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See id., arts. 20(4)(b), 21(3).
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The International Law Commission, in commenting on the draft terms of the
Vienna Convention, explained that “a power to formulate reservations must in the nature of
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Neither the Vienna Convention nor the ICJ opinion in the Genocide
Convention case provides much guidance about the meaning of the “object and
purpose” test. Moreover, there has been little subsequent judicial analysis of
the test, and no determination ever that a reservation ran afoul of the test.
Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that the U.S. reservations to the ICPPR violate
the treaty’s object and purpose. The United States accepted the overwhelming
majority of the treaty’s dozens of substantive provisions. It made a handful of
reservations, to be sure. But over a third of the parties to the ICPPR made
reservations to over a dozen substantive provisions.130 The United States was
the only nation to adhere to a broad reservation to the death penalty provisions,
but in other respects its RUDs practice differs little from the practice of many
other countries.131
Most significantly, like the United States, many countries conditioned
their consent to the ICCPR in order to conform the treaty obligations to their
domestic laws. France, for example, entered reservations and declarations
ensuring that its ICCPR obligations were no more demanding than domestic
law with respect to presidential power, military discipline, immigration,
appellate criminal review, regulation of war propaganda, and minority rights.
Belgium conditioned consent to ensure that the ICCPR did not affect its
domestic law with respect to sex discrimination concerning the exercise of
royal powers, the protection of juvenile criminal offenders, various criminal
procedures, freedom of speech, and marriage. The United Kingdom gave its
consent on the condition that its domestic law not be affected with respect to
free legal assistance, spousal equality, election law, military discipline, and
immigration. And, of course, treaties in the United Kingdom and many other
countries are not considered self-executing.
These facts make it difficult to conclude that the United States
reservations to the ICCPR violate its object and purpose. As the ICJ noted in
the Genocide Convention case, a central object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention is that “as many States as possible should participate.”132 Even the
Human Rights Committee has described the object and purpose of the ICCPR
things tend to make it easier for some States to execute the act necessary to bind themselves
finally to participating in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a greater measure of
universality in the application of the treaty.” Reports of the International Law Commission on
the Second Part of its 17th Session and on its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l & Comm’n
169, 205-06, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1.
130

See Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 98, at 393.
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The information in this paragraph is drawn from the United Nations Treaty
Collection, see <http://untreaty.un.org>.
132

Genocide Convention Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. at 24. The ICJ continued: “The
complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the
scope of application, but would detract from the authority of its moral and humanitarian
principles which are its basis.” Id.
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in a similarly general way.133 This goal is served even when there are
reservations to parts of the treaty.134 While many consider the provisions
reserved by the United States as important, it is hard to view the relatively few
reservations as incompatible with the fundamental purpose of having as many
states as possible become parties to the treaties.135
Several technical legal arguments under the Vienna Convention support
the conclusion that U.S. reservations do not violate the object and purpose of
the ICCPR. Unlike other human rights treaties, including one of the optional
protocols to the ICCPR (which the United States has not ratified), the ICCPR
contains no clause excluding reservations, and no reference to the object and
purpose test. Only eleven of the 144 states that are parties to the ICCPR have
objected to the U.S. RUDs, nine on the ground that the reservations violated
the object and purpose of the treaty.136 These objecting nations provided little
133

See General Comment 24(52), supra note 102, ¶ 7 (“The object and purpose of the
Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and
political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for
those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the
obligations undertaken.”).
134

The RUDs also typically contain non-self-execution clauses, but it is difficult to
see how these clauses could violate the object and purpose of the treaties. As Professor
Vazquez recently explained, “Such a reservation does nothing more than establish for the
United States the rule that applies in other countries (such as the United Kingdom) by virtue of
their constitutions – i.e., that the treaty will not have the force of domestic law until
legislatively implemented. If such a provision were contrary to the object and purpose of the
treaty, the U.K. could never become a party to the treaty.” Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing
at Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2188 n.138 (1999).
135

If, by contrast, the United States had ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, which prohibits the use of the death penalty, it might well have violated the object and
purpose of the Protocol for the United States to have reserved a general right to impose capital
punishment. Of course, the United States has not ratified the Protocol and, in any event, the
Protocol expressly disallows all reservations except for a reservation providing for the
“application of the death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious
crime of a military nature committed during wartime.” G.A. Res. 44/128, annex, 44 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/44/49, art. 2(1) (1989). Similarly, it might well have
violated the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention if the
United States had ratified those treaties while reserving the right to commit genocide and
torture. But this is not what happened; rather, the United States accepted the prohibitions on
genocide and torture and simply attempted, through its RUDs, to clarify the scope of the terms
to which it was consenting. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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See United Nations Treaty Collection, <http://untreaty.un.org>. Twelve of the 130
countries that are parties to the Genocide Convention have objected to the U.S. RUDs; three of
the 119 countries that are parties to the Torture Convention have objected to the U.S. RUDs;
and none of the 156 countries that are parties to the Race Convention has objected to the U.S.
RUDs. See id. Compare those numbers to the test set forth in the Race Convention whereby a
reservation will be deemed incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention if twothirds of the parties object to the reservation. See International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), art. 20(2). There have been no
specific objections, in connection with any of the treaties, to the United States’ non-selfexecution declarations.
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or no explanation for their objections. What is important under the Vienna
Convention, however, is that none of the objections came within the twelve
months of communication of the U.S. reservations.137 Under Article 20(5) of
the Vienna Convention, therefore, the U.S. reservations are deemed
accepted.138 In addition, none of the nations that objected to the reservations
claimed that the United States was not a party to the treaty. Under Articles
20(4)(b) and 21(3) of the Vienna Convention, then, the United States is, at
worst, a party to the treaty and the provisions to which the reservations relate
do not apply between the United States and the objecting nations.139
Some commentators have responded to these latter points by arguing
that other nations do not have the power under international law to consent to
reservations that violate the object and purpose of the Convention. The
Genocide Convention decision did suggest such a restriction. The Vienna
Convention, which supersedes the statement of customary international law in
the Genocide Convention decision, is unclear about whether the rules for
acceptance of reservations in Article 20 apply to all reservations, or only to
ones that survive Article 19’s object and purpose test.140 Both the Vienna
Convention’s drafting history and the state practice under the Convention
suggest that Article 20 applies to all reservations, and thus that the object and
purpose test is not an independent bar to other nations’ acceptance of
reservations under the Vienna Convention.141 The Human Rights Committee
appears to agree with this reading of the Convention because, in explaining
why the failure by nations to object to reservations to the ICCPR did not
constitute an acceptance of the reservations, it felt compelled to maintain that
the Vienna Convention’s rules about tacit consent to reservations “are
137

See Redgwell, Reservations, supra note 98, at 395.

138

See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 20(5) (“[U]nless the treaty otherwise
provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no
objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the
reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,
whichever is later.”).
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See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 20(4)(b) (“[A]n objection by another
contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between
the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitively expressed by the
objecting State.”); id., art. 21(3) (“When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the
entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the
reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.”).
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In commentary on the original draft version of Articles 19 and 20, the International
Law Commission suggested that the object and purpose test is not an independent barrier to
reservation acceptance by other nations. See Documents of the Conference on the Vienna
Convention, A/CONF.39/11/Add.2. In subsequent negotiations, many nations proposed
amendments to the Vienna Convention to clarify that the object and purpose test was an
absolute bar to reservations, but these amendments were all rejected. See Redgwell,
Universality or Integrity, supra note 98, at 255-60.
141
On the drafting history and state practice, see Redgwell, Universality or Integrity,
supra note 98, at 273-77.

Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent

34

inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human rights
treaties.”142 These factors, taken together, suggest that the best reading of the
Vienna Convention and related customary international law is that other
nations have effectively consented to the validity of the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR.143
Because of ambiguities in the Vienna Convention, and the lack of a
centralized decisionmaker with authority to determine the validity of
reservations, there is room for disagreement with this conclusion. This fact is
probably beside the point because, as discussed above, the U.S. reservations
almost certainly do not violate the ICCPR’s object and purpose. But even if
one concluded that the United States’ RUDs did violate the object and purpose
test, and that they were not cured by other nations’ failure to object to them, it
is clearly incorrect to conclude, as the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee and
others have, that the United States continues to be bound by the ICCPR,
including ICCPR terms to which it did not consent.144 One of the most
established principles in international law is that “in treaty relations a State
cannot be bound without its consent.”145 It would contravene this fundamental
principle of international law to invalidate a reservation to a treaty but hold the
party to the remainder of the treaty without recognizing the reservation.146 This
conclusion is especially clear where, as with the U.S. ratification of the
ICCPR, the reservations are “integral parts of its consent to be bound.”147 The
United Nations’ International Law Commission recently confirmed this
conclusion and (along with several individual nations) expressly rejected the
contrary views of the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee.148
142

General Comment 24(52), supra note 102, ¶ 17.
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At the very least, the drafting history of the Vienna Convention, as well as
subsequent state practice, suggest that as a matter of customary international law arising from
the Vienna Convention, the object and purpose test is not a bar to reservations independent of
nations’ consent to the reservations.
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See id., ¶ 18 (concluding that a reservation that violates the object and purpose test
“will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for the [United
States] without benefit of the reservation”).
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Genocide Convention Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. at 21; see also, e.g., Restatement
(Third), supra note 22, pt. I, introductory note at 18 (“Modern international law is rooted in
acceptance by states which constitute the system.”).
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See Redgwell, Universality or Integrity, supra note 98, at 267 (“It was never the
intention of the ICJ, the ILC or the [Vienna Convention] that a State should be bound by a
provision to which it had not indicated its consent.”).
147

Observations by the Government of the United States of America on No. 24(52)
(transmitted by letter dated March 28, 1995), reprinted in 16 Human Rights L.J. 422 (1995)
[hereinafter “U.S. Response”]. Cf. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 66
(July 6) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (arguing that when an invalid reservation is an
essential component of a nation’s consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, the entire consent is “devoid of legal effect”).
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The United States, Great Britain, and France strongly objected to the views of the
ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee expressed in General Comment 24(52), including its
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In sum, if the U.S. RUDs really do violate the object and purpose of the
ICCPR, and the acquiescence of the other parties to the treaty has not rectified
this problem, there are only two possible remedies under international law:
either the United States is not a party to the treaty provisions with respect to
which it has reserved (which yields the same result as if the RUDs were
enforced), or the United States is not a party to the treaty at all.149

IV.

DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In the last Part, we explained why the U.S. RUDs are consistent with
customary international law principles of treaty formation. Even if the
international law objections to the RUDs were more persuasive, however, they
would not provide a basis for invalidating the RUDs in U.S. courts. In a
variety of circumstances, U.S. courts give effect to actions by political branch
actors even if those actions violate international law. For example, they apply
a federal statute even if it violates customary international law,150 and even if it
views concerning the proper remedy for invalid reservations. See 4 IHRR 6-8 (1997) (France);
3 IHRR 261-69 (1996) (Great Britain and United States). In a 1997 report, the United Nations’
International Law Commission similarly rejected a number of the conclusions in General
Comment 24(52). Among other things, the Commission concluded that the Vienna
Convention’s flexible regime for reservations applies to human rights treaties, that “the legal
force of the findings made by monitoring bodies in the exercise of their power to deal with
reservations cannot exceed that resulting from the powers given to them for the performance of
their general monitoring role,” and that the proper remedy for situations in which a nation
insists on retaining an invalid reservation as a condition of its consent to a treaty is that the
nation is no longer a party to the treaty. See Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its forty-ninth session, UN GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc.
A/52/10(1997). This portion of the Commission’s 1997 Report was based on the
Commission’s consideration of reports from Alain Pellet, whom the Commission had
appointed as Special Rapporteur for this topic. Pellet’s reports were highly critical of General
Comment 24(52). See UN Doc. A/CN.4/470 and Corr. 1 (1995); UN Doc. A/CN.4/477 and
Add. 1 (1996).
149

In two controversial decisions, the European Court of Human Rights has enforced
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights notwithstanding reservations to the
provisions. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Belilos v. Switzerland,
132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). Those decisions, however, were based on the particular
features of the European Convention and were “not simply applying general principles of
treaty law.” Redgwell, Universality or Integrity, supra note 98, at 266; see also Susan Marks,
Reservations Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights, 39
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 300, 327 (1990) (criticizing the Belilos decision and tying it to “structural
features of the [European] Convention”). Moreover, the decisions were premised on a finding
that the countries in those cases would have ratified the Convention even without the
reservations. By contrast, the United States has made clear that its reservations are an essential
condition of its ratification.
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See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54
(11th Cir. 1986).
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conflicts with an earlier inconsistent treaty.151 Similarly, they uphold
Executive Branch actions that violate customary international law.152 In these
and many other contexts, the U.S. courts follow a dualist approach to the
relationship between international law and domestic law: They treat
international and domestic law as distinct, they rely on domestic law to
determine international law’s status within the U.S. legal system, and, in case
of a conflict, they give domestic law primacy over international law unless
domestic law specifies otherwise.153
American dualism means that U.S. courts will ultimately judge the
domestic legal validity of the RUDs by reference to domestic constitutional
law. In recognition of this point, critics have argued that the RUDs violate
several domestic constitutional principles, including separation of powers, the
Supremacy Clause, the treaty power, and federalism. In this Part, we explain
why these constitutional arguments are unpersuasive. We begin, however,
with thoughts about the nature of judicial review in the context of the RUDs.
A.

Judicial Review

Critics of the RUDs argue for extraordinary judicial intervention into
the treaty process. Consider the Domingues case, in which the petitioner
argued that Nevada’s death penalty for juvenile offenders violated Article 6 of
the ICCPR.154 For the petitioner in Domingues to prevail, a U.S. court would
have to hold the treatymakers’ reservation declining consent to Article 6
invalid; determine that the United States was nonetheless still bound by the
151

See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99
(1884). Technically, a statute that violates a treaty also violates the customary international
law principle requiring treaty compliance – pacta sunt servanda.
152

See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert
v. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d
1446 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980),
aff’d on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). The relationship between treaties and
the Executive Branch is less clear. It is possible that courts will apply self-executing treaties to
restrict Executive Branch action in some circumstances. Cf. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (assuming that Executive Branch violation of a self-executing
extradition treaty might provide a basis for dismissing criminal prosecution). The validity of
the President’s termination of a treaty, however, may be non-justiciable. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality).
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See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 529 (1999) (explaining differences between
“monist” and “dualist” approaches to the relationship between international and domestic law).
Another example of the United States’ dualist approach is the well-settled rule that, within
U.S. courts, the individual rights protections of the U.S. Constitution take precedence over
international law. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 16 (1957) (plurality).
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See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
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entire treaty, including the provision to which it declined consent; and
determine that the non-self-executing declaration was invalid, and that the
entire treaty, including the provision to which the United States did not
consent, applied in the domestic realm to preempt state law. To state these
claims is to understand why courts are not likely to engage in the aggressive
forms of judicial review needed to credit them.
United States courts have never exercised judicial review to invalidate
either the domestic or international effects of a treaty on structural
constitutional grounds. This is in part due to the nature of the treaty power.
Compared to Article I, the Treaty Clause and related provisions for making
international agreements are obscure.155 As Hayden notes, the treaty clause’s
“elasticity of details” left “to successive Senates and to successive Presidents
the problem and the privilege of determining under the stress of government
the precise manner in which they are to make the treaties of the nation.”156 In
addition, treaties have a dual nature – they are in part legal instruments, to be
sure, but their creation and especially their enforcement are very much
informed by political factors in a way that is not true of domestic law.157 These
factors, taken together, have resulted in numerous practical and sometimes
changing accommodations among the treatymakers (some of which have
provoked disagreement) about how treaties are made, enforced, and
terminated. Examples include the particular procedures for making treaties,158
the rise of congressional-executive agreements as a substitute (or nearsubstitute) for treaties,159 and the power to terminate treaties,160 none of which
155

As one commentator on the treaty clause has noted:

“The Constitution contains no elaboration of the treaty clause. There is no
definition or description of the process by which this power shall be
executed. Did the ‘fathers’ intend that the President and Senate should meet
in private conference or did they assume that the President would formally
submit treaties to the Senate and that the upper house would grant or
withhold its consent to ratification? Was the power of the Senate to be coextensive with that of the President or were the Senators obliged to defer
action until a formal executive message was received? Was the Senate
empowered to inaugurate negotiations? In regard to the instructions given
negotiators, did the Senate have a right to consider, approve, or reject them?
It is idle to essay answers to the questions from the treaty-making clause.
The debates of the Constitutional Convention evidence that no definitive
procedure was contemplated or agreed upon by the ‘fathers.’”
Royden Dangerfield, In Defense of the Senate: A Study in Treaty Making 31-32 (1933).
156

Hayden, supra note 20, at 2.
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See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)
(“A treaty is primarily a compact between independent Nations. It depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are
parties to it.”).
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See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 177-78.

See Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 303, cmt. e (“The prevailing view is that
the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in
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is addressed by constitutional text, and all of which have developed in
particular ways as a result of the contingencies of domestic and international
politics.
Recognizing the lack of textual guidance and the importance of
political contingency in this context, U.S. courts have taken a largely passive
role in the institutional developments concerning the making and enforcement
of treaties. They usually defer to the accommodations of the political branches
(such as the rise of congressional-executive agreements)161 or abstain from
adjudicating disputes between the political branches (such as the termination of
treaties).162 Similarly, they treat matters pertaining to the negotiation,
observance, and termination of treaties as “political questions” committed to
the discretion of the political branches.163 They also give “great weight” to the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty.164 And, of course, judicial
deference to the political branch arrangements is especially strong in situations,
as with the RUDs, in which the political branches all agree on the assertion of
constitutional power.165
With these points in mind, we now turn to the specific constitutional
arguments made by critics of the RUDs. Any normative constitutional analysis
encounters the initial problem that the appropriate sources of U.S.

every instance.”); Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 217 (“[I]t is now widely accepted
that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is
a complete alternative to a treaty.”).
160

See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 211-214.
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See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 799 (1995); see also, e.g., Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d
1226 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (rejecting constitutional challenge to North American Free Trade
Agreement).
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See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality) (four justices
express view that President’s constitutional authority to terminate treaty is a nonjusticiable
political question).
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See Edwin D. Dickinson, International Political Questions in National Courts, 19
Am. J. Int’l L. 157, 161 & n. 17 (1925) (citing cases and examples).
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See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,
194 (1961); see also Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 326(2). See generally Curtis A.
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2000).
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See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 653, 668 (1981) (“When the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his
powers but also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive action ‘would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,
and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.’”) (quoting
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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constitutional law are contested.166 We hope to address this problem by
showing that under any of the major theories of constitutional interpretation,
the RUDs are valid. Because the critics of the RUDs invoke structural
constitutional arguments, most of our arguments in support of the validity of
the RUDs are structural as well. Along the way, however, we hope to show
that our conclusion about the constitutionality of the RUDs is also consistent
with originalist, textualist, majoritarian, and translation (or changed
circumstances) approaches to constitutional interpretation.167
B.

Separation of Powers

Some commentators have suggested that the RUDs present a separation
of powers conflict between the President and the Senate.168 There are several
related claims here. One is that the RUDs may infringe on the President’s
constitutional prerogatives in making treaties. Another is that RUDs are “antimajoritarian” because they allow a minority of Senators to force limitations on
treaties through their power to block the two-thirds consent needed for
ratification.169 Yet another is that the RUDs constitute an improper “line-item
veto” because the Senate is in effect trying to change the terms of the treaty.170
Separation of powers claims are often difficult to assess because there
is no settled understanding of the proper relationship among the three branches
of the federal government. Regardless of whether one views these matters
from a formalist or functionalist perspective,171 however, the various arguments
made against RUDs under the rubric of separation of powers are unconvincing.
166

See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1247 (1997) (discussing various constitutional theories).
167
One major potential source of constitutional interpretation, original understanding,
provides little concrete guidance about most constitutional questions concerning RUDs. We
know of nothing in the Founding materials that speaks to the validity of conditional consent
one way or another, and critics of the RUDs do not rely on such materials. Moreover, a recent
exhaustive historical debate over the related question of whether and to what extent the
Founders viewed treaties to be self-executing uncovered no evidence about the original
understanding of the conditional consent power. See sources cited supra note 2. As we
explained in Part I, however, constitutional practice since the Founding does support the RUDs
practice. The treatymakers have attached substantive reservations throughout U.S. history.
Functional analogues to non-self-execution declarations have also been attached to treaties
since the nineteenth century. In short, historical constitutional practice provides some support
for, and certainly does not detract from, the validity of the modern RUDs practice.
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See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 4; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4.

169

See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 600-01.
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See, e.g., John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45
U. Cath. L. Rev. 1213, 1233-34 (1996). This argument was also made in the Domingues case,
discussed above.
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For an overview of this distinction and its significance for separation of powers
jurisprudence, see Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of
Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
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This is especially true, we hope to show, when one descends from abstract
concerns about democracy and Executive power, and attends to the concrete
terms and structure of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract
generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents
that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”172
There are essentially three problems with separation of powers claims
against RUDs. First, the factual supposition underlying the claims – that the
Senate “imposes” the RUDs on an otherwise unwilling President – is simply
false. As discussed above, RUDs to human rights treaties have all been
proposed by presidents in the first instance rather than by the Senate, and they
are usually adopted by the Senate without change. The Senate sometimes
revises proposed presidential RUDs, but always in cooperation with the
Executive Branch, always in a modest way, and sometimes in the direction of
narrowing the scope of the RUDs.173 Even if RUDs could in theory constitute
interference with Presidential power, a point we contest below, interference is
not an issue with respect to the human rights RUDs, where the President and
Senate have worked together.
Second, even if the Senate attached RUDs unilaterally, the RUDs
would not in any way bind the President. The Senate must attach RUDs
before, and not after, ratification.174 And the President is never obligated to
accept the RUDs. If he disagrees with them, he can simply refuse to ratify the
treaty, as several presidents have in fact done.175 This distinguishes RUDs
from the line-item and legislative vetos, which the Supreme Court invalidated
because they constituted attempts by one branch or house of the legislature to

172

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,

946 (1983).
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For example, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ultimately gave its
consent to the Torture Convention, it noted that the RUDs were “the product of a cooperative
and successful negotiating process between the executive branch, this committee, and
interested private groups.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading treatment or Punishment, Sen. Exec. Rep. 101-30, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 4
(August 30, 1990). Of course, this cooperation takes place against the background of the
Senate’s potential threat of non-consent, a point we discuss below.
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See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901) (“The
meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those who
may have voted to ratify it.”); id. at 183 (Brown, J., concurring) (“The Senate has no right to
ratify the treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other
power . . . .”); New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898) (refusing to give
effect to treaty proviso adopted by the Senate because “there is no evidence that it ever
received the sanction and approval of the President”).
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For example, President Taft declined to ratify arbitration treaties with France and
Great Britain after the Senate insisted on certain reservations. See Restatement (Third), supra
note 22, § 303, reporters’ note 3.
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alter-already enacted law.176 RUDs do not alter already-enacted law. Rather,
they are analogous to a Bill passed by both Houses of Congress and sent to the
President for his approval or veto. The President retains the discretion to sign
the Bill despite disagreements with its content, or to veto the Bill because of
disagreement with its content. The President plays a functionally identical role
with respect to Senate conditions. In neither case does he have sole discretion
to make federal law, but in both cases he has the final say about whether to
make federal law.177
Third, RUDs attached by the Senate are not “undemocratic” or “antimajoritarian” in a constitutionally meaningful sense. It is true that a minority
of senators can insist on a package of RUDs as a precondition to senatorial
consent to the treaty. As we explained above, this power flows from Article II,
which requires two-thirds senatorial consent as a precondition to making treaty
commitments.178 In other words, the power of conditional consent is a direct
consequence of the Constitution’s particular super-majoritarian treatymaking
procedure. This is but one of many devices in the Constitution designed to
protect minority interests.179
One might argue that the original reasons for the Senate’s minority veto
– to create a structural bias against international agreements, and to protect
state prerogatives180 – are no longer valid. This is not a view that we, or any
branch of the federal government, share. In any event, this argument has little
purchase in the context of RUDs attached to human rights treaties. In this
context, Congress and the President remain free to enact a subsequent statute
that contains domestic human rights protections without the limitations
contained in the RUDs.181 This later enacted statute, which a minority of
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See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446 (1998) (invalidating Line Item Veto
Act because, unlike other statutes, “this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change
the text of duly enacted statutes”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (invalidating oneHouse veto because “the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons”).
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Except, of course, that the Senate cannot override the President’s refusal to ratify
in the treaty context. In this regard the Senate has less authority vis-a-vis the President in the
treatymaking process than the House and Senate have vis-a-vis the President in the lawmaking
process.
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See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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Other constitutional provisions designed to protect minority interests include the
Article I bicameralism and presentment process, the Article II impeachment process, the
Article V constitutional amendment process, and, of course, the Bill of Rights.
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See Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and
Abrogation of Treaties – the Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically
Examined, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Rakove, supra note 20.
181
Of course, this legislation, like the treaty that it would supersede, must be
consistent with the Constitution.
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Senators would have no power to block, would trump any prior inconsistent
provisions of the treaty.182
C.

Non-Self-Execution

Critics of the RUDs also claim that the non-self-execution declarations
are unconstitutional because they violate the Supremacy Clause and exceed
implicit limits on the treaty power.
1.

The Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause states in relevant part that “all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby.”183 Many commentators have argued that this language mandates that
human rights treaties have the status of self-executing federal law, regardless
of the wishes of the U.S. treatymakers.184 As Professor Henkin argues:
“Article VI of the Constitution provides expressly for
lawmaking by treaty: treaties are declared to be the supreme law
of the land. The Framers intended that a treaty should become
law ipso facto, when the treaty is made; it should not require
legislative implementation to convert it into United States law.
In effect, lawmaking by treaty was to be an alternative to
legislation by Congress.”185
Henkin concludes that the “patterns of non-self-executing declarations
[attached to human rights treaties] threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty
system.”186
This argument misunderstands the Supremacy Clause. By its terms, the
Clause makes all federal laws supreme over state laws. The Clause does not,
however, affect the power of U.S. lawmakers to define the domestic scope of
the law they make, either as to the states or as to other federal laws. In other
words, it operates as an enhancement of federal lawmaking power vis-a-vis
182

See supra note 154. A minority of Senators might have some ability to block such
a statute through the filibuster power, just as it would have the power to block any other
statute. It is also possible that the President and Congress could adopt the human rights
protections by means of a congressional-executive agreement. The conventional wisdom
today is that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are largely interchangeable. See
supra note 159.
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U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 4, at 527; Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 346.
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Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 346.
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Id. at 348.

Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent

43

state laws and judges, and not, as RUDs critics would have it, as a limit on
federal lawmaking power.
Four examples illustrate this point. First, the Supremacy clause makes
federal statutes, like treaties, the supreme law of the land. It is well settled,
however, that Congress has the power to specify that federal laws do not
preempt state law, do not invalidate prior federal law, or are not subject to
enforcement in federal or state courts.187 Second, the Constitution is also part
of the supreme law of the Land, yet many constitutional provisions are nonself-executing. For example, most of the grants of federal court jurisdiction in
Article III are non-self-executing.188 Third, congressional-executive
agreements – which are equivalent to treaties on the international plane – are
considered part of the supreme law of the land,189 but it is widely accepted that
Congress and the President can limit the self-executing effect of these
agreements.190 Fourth, and most directly relevant, it has long been settled that,
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, not all treaties are self-executing.191
With respect to the last point, critics of the RUDs generally concede
that not all treaties are self-executing, but they argue that the self-execution
issue must be resolved solely by the terms of the treaty, not conditions imposed
on the treaty by the Senate or President. Nothing in the language of the
Supremacy Clause or in U.S. historical traditions suggests that this is true. As
noted above, federal lawmakers generally have the power to limit the domestic
effects of their enactments, and there is no reason to believe that lawmaking by
treaty should be viewed differently.192 Moreover, it has long been accepted
187

There is some debate over the limits of Congress’s power to preclude federal
statutes from judicial review in federal courts, but it is settled that Congress has some such
power, and any limits on such power do not come from the Supremacy Clause. See generally
Richard A. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 34887 (4th ed. 1996).
188
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See id. at 28.
See Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 111.
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See, e.g., Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 217 n.**; Damrosch, supra
note 4, at 525-26; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 641. For example, in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, which authorizes the latest GATT agreement, Congress stated that
“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstances, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States
shall have effect.” Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, § 102 (1994). Congress also stated
that no one other than the United States “shall have any cause of action or defense under any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements” or challenge “any action or inaction of . . . the United States,
in any State, or any political subdivision of a state on the ground that such action or inaction is
inconsistent” with one of the agreements. Id. § 102(c)(1).
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See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also, e.g., Terlinden v.
Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902).
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Critics of the RUDs often quote from early historical materials to the effect that the
inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause was designed to reduce treaty violations
attributable to the United States. They argue that non-self-execution declarations contravene
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that certain treaties (such as those that declare war, create criminal liability,
appropriate money, or impose taxes) are non-self-executing.193 In these
instances, domestic separation of powers considerations are thought to compel
non-self-execution, regardless of the terms of the treaties.
In any event, even if it were true that the issue of self-execution had to
be determined solely by reference to the terms of the treaty, the United States’
non-self-execution declarations are in fact part of the terms of the treaties.
They are included within the U.S. ratification documents that define the nature
of the U.S. obligations to other countries, and all other parties to the treaties are
on notice of them.194 Moreover, unlike some of the United States’ substantive
reservations, no nation has specifically objected to the non-self-execution
declarations. And it would be difficult for any nation to do so, since many
nations’ constitutions render all treaties non-self-executing and require
separate implementing legislation for the treaties to have domestic force.
Thus, even if the treatymakers could only control the domestic scope of a
treaty by including limitations within the treaty itself (a point for which there is
no support), that is precisely what the non-self-executing declarations
accomplish.195
2.

Scope of the Treaty Power

The second argument made against the non-self-execution declarations
is that, even if they do not violate the Supremacy Clause, they exceed the
scope of the treaty power. Here it is argued that Article II only allows the
this purpose because they heighten the risk that the United States will violate international law.
None of this historical evidence, however, suggests that the Supremacy Clause was meant to
limit the treatymakers’ control over the domestic force of treaties. Rather, it shows only that
the Framers wished to give the national government the power to prevent treaty violations by
U.S. states if they so desired. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that, under the Articles of Confederation, “the treaties of
the United States . . . are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures”); 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 316 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (noting concern by
James Madison regarding “the tendency of the States to these violations” of the law of nations
and treaties). See generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 2218 (1999).
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See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925) (“It is not the
function of treaties to enact the fiscal or criminal law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is
self-executing.”); see also Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 111, cmt. i and reporters’ note
6; CRS Study, supra note 14, at 48-49.
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This was a point consistently emphasized by the Senate and various presidential
administrations. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 66, at 40 (statement of Jack Goldklang,
Department of Justice); Genocide Convention Report, supra note 66, at 16-17.
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See Vazquez, Laughing, supra note 134, at 2186-88 (agreeing with this
conclusion); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am.
J. Int’l L. 695, 708 n.61 (1995) (same).
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treatymakers to make “Treaties,” and that the non-self-execution declarations
are not encompassed within that term. These declarations, the argument goes,
concern only the domestic implementation of the treaty and thus are not part of
the international agreement itself.196
There are many problems with this argument. First, as noted above, the
non-self-execution declarations are included with the U.S. instrument of
ratification, and other nations are therefore on notice of the declarations and
have an opportunity to object to them. As a result, it is unclear why they do
not form part of the international agreement – the “Treaty,” to use the term in
Article II – entered into by the U.S. treatymakers.
Second, to the extent that critics of the RUDs are arguing that the
treatymakers lack the power to include treaty conditions that are “domestic” in
nature, their argument proves too much. If the treaty power were limited to
truly “international” matters, human rights treaties, and not just their non-selfexecution declarations, would be suspect. These treaties regulate the internal
relationships between governments and their citizens. Moreover, as
international tribunals have recognized, these treaties do not impose reciprocal
obligations in any meaningful sense.197 For these reasons, a number of
international law scholars, as well as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations, have denied that there is any subject matter limitation on the treaty
power.198 Critics of the RUDs have not disputed this general proposition;
instead, they claim that the treatymakers, in effect, have unlimited power to
make treaties but no power whatsoever to determine the treaties’ domestic
effect. There is nothing in the Article II treaty clause that suggests such an
unlikely distinction.
Third, even if there were a subject matter limitation on the substantive
terms that the U.S. treatymakers could agree to, it would still reasonable to
conclude, as argued above, that the power to make such treaties includes
within it the power to control the domestic implementation of the treaties. Just
as Congress’s Article I powers to make legislation include the power to limit
the effect of the legislation in U.S. courts, so too should the treatymakers’
196

See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 4, at 69; Quigley, The International Covenant,
supra note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 4, at 590-600; Dearborn, Note, supra
note 4, at 239-44.
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For example, as noted above, the International Court of Justice has stated that with
human rights “one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to states, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.” See supra note 122
and accompanying text. Similarly, the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee has stated that
human rights treaties “are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations” and that
the “principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place” in this context. General Comment
24(52), supra note 102, at ¶ 17.
198
See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 18, at 197-98; Restatement (Third), supra
note 22, § 302, reporters’ note 2.
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Article II powers to make treaties be construed to include the power of
domestic limitation.199
This conclusion is reinforced by the changed nature of treatymaking.
As an original matter, the Framers never could have imagined, and probably
did not intend, that the treaty power would extend to treaties with other nations
concerning how the United States should treat its own citizens.200 Rather,
original constitutional understandings and long constitutional practice
contemplate that changes in domestic rights protections should be made
through the bicameral legislative process in order to ensure a broad domestic
consensus. The non-self-execution declaration allows the United States to
commit itself to international human rights protections while at the same time
accommodating this basic constitutional principle. This is a perfectly
legitimate decision under international law, which does not require any
particular form of domestic implementation.201
Additional support for this conclusion comes from the practice of
congressional-executive agreements. As mentioned above, non-self-execution
declarations can be attached to congressional-executive agreements.202 This
shows that nothing inherent in the power to make international agreements
precludes control over the domestic scope of these agreements. In addition,
the dramatic increase in the use of congressional-executive agreements in place
of treaties has been justified on the ground that the bicameral process for
making international agreements better reflects majoritarian preferences than
the two-thirds Senate consent process.203 But this is precisely the same end
that is served by non-self-execution declarations, which ensure that important
domestic legal changes are implemented through the bicameral legislative
process. The non-self-execution declarations thus promote the same
199

See Restatement (Third), supra note 22, § 303, reporters’ note 4 (explaining that
the attachment of a non-self-execution declaration by the Senate “is an expression of the
Senate’s constitutional authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty”).
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See, e.g., The Federalist No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that treaties will concern issues such as “war, peace, and commerce”); The Federalist
No. 75, at 450-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that treaties are “not rules prescribed by the
sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign”); The Debates in
the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, reprinted in 3 Elliot’s Debates 504
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888) (statement by Edmund Randolph that “neither the life nor
property of any citizen, not the particular right of any state, can be affected by a treaty”); id. at
514 (statement of James Madison that “[t]he object of treaties it the regulation of intercourse
with foreign nations, and is external”).
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See Louis Henkin, et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 153 (3d ed.
1993); see also Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 346 (“International law requires the United
States to carry out its treaty obligations but, in the absence of special provision, does not
prescribe how, or through which agencies, they shall be carried out.”).
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See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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majoritarian aims that support the interchangeability of congressionalexecutive agreements and treaties.
D.

Potential Limits

Nothing in the analysis thus far suggests that there are limitations on
the conditional consent power of the President and Senate. We can imagine
two possible limitations. We do not embrace these limitations; we merely wish
to show that these plausible limitations would not apply to the conditions
imposed in connection with human rights treaties.
One possible limitation is that the condition must have some
relationship to the treaty. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law argues, “Surely, a condition that has no relation to the treaty would be
improper, for example, a requirement that the President dismiss or appoint
some cabinet officer.”204 This limitation is simply a weak nexus requirement
that presumably attaches to all exercises of constitutional power.205 As the
Restatement (Third) acknowledges, the non-self-execution declarations meet
this requirement, since they concern the terms and domestic status of the treaty
in question.206
A second possible limitation is that the Senate cannot use its
conditional consent power to alter pre-existing federal law. This limitation is
suggested by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Power Authority of New York v.
Federal Power Commission.207 The question there was the validity of a Senate
condition, labeled a “reservation,” to a treaty between the United States and
Canada concerning use of the waters of the Niagara River.208 The reservation
stated that “no project for redevelopment of the United States’ share of such
waters shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Congress.”209
The question in Power Authority was whether the reservation invalidated the
Federal Power Commission’s pre-existing licensing authority under the
Federal Power Act of 1920.210 The D.C. Circuit concluded that the reservation
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did not have this effect because it was not intended by the Senate to be a
condition of ratification.211
In reaching this conclusion, the court suggested that if the Senate had
intended the statement to be a condition of ratification, the condition might
have been beyond the Senate’s powers. To the extent that the court was
insinuating that non-self-execution declarations per se are constitutionally
suspect, we disagree for the reasons already outlined above.212 Our present
concern is with a narrower limitation suggested by Power Authority. The
Senate’s “reservation,” if treated as a binding treaty condition, would have
limited the effect of a pre-existing domestic statute that, by its terms, governed
the development of the Niagara River waters. The court might have believed
that the Senate was attempting, through its conditional consent power, to
change existing law without the involvement of the House of Representatives.213
Assuming that this characterization of the Niagara reservation is accurate,214
such an exercise of the conditional consent power might exceed the Senate’s
powers under Article II.215 Such a limitation, however, would not affect the
validity of non-self-execution declarations, which are designed to avoid
changing existing law without full participation of the House.
211

One of the three panel judges dissented, arguing that the Senate intended its
“reservation” to be a condition of ratification and that the condition was a valid exercise of the
Senate’s advice and consent power because it was related to the treaty. The dissenting judge
also argued that if the condition were in fact beyond the Senate’s powers, the United States
would not be a party to the treaty at all because the Senate would not have given effective
consent. See 247 F.2d at 544 (Bastian, J., dissenting).
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Some have drawn this inference from the court’s statement that the Constitution
might not allow the federal treatymakers to create binding treaties, or conditions on treaties,
addressing matters of “purely domestic concern,” 247 F.2d at 543. See Halberstam, supra note
4, at 69; Quigley, The International Covenant, supra note 4, at 1303-05; Riesenfeld & Abbott,
supra note 4, at 590-600. For a famous, and in our view convincing defense of the Niagara
reservation’s validity, see Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 34; see also Damrosch,
supra note 4, at 527 n.48 (concluding that the reasoning of the Power Authority decision
“would probably not be extended to non-self-executing declarations”); cf. 247 F.2d at 542
(stating that “[t]he Senate could, of course, have attached to its consent a reservation to the
effect that the rights and obligations of the signatory parties should not arise until after the
passage of an act of Congress” and that “[s]uch a reservation, if accepted by Canada, would
have made the treaty executory”).
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That is precisely how Professors Philip Jessup and Oliver Lissitzyn characterized
the issue in a brief they submitted in support of the Power Authority. See Opinion of Phillip
C. Jessup & Oliver J. Lissitzyn for the Power Authority of the State of New York (Dec. 1955),
quoted in Bishop, supra note 116, at 319-20.
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Professor Henkin contested that characterization of the Niagara reservation,
arguing that “[t]he President and Senate have merely refused to throw new and valuable
resources into an old established system of development which Congress may not have
intended and may not now desire.” Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 34, at 1174.
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On the other hand, longstanding case law suggests that the U.S. treatymakers
acting together have the power to override a prior inconsistent federal statute, see supra note
154, so it is not entirely clear why the Senate cannot condition its consent on such an effect.
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Federalism

As noted, the package of RUDs typically includes a federalism
understanding that emphasizes that the treaties do not affect the constitutional
balance of authority between the State and Federal governments. Many
commentators believe that there are no federalism limitations on the treaty
power, and they therefore question the need for these understandings.216 For
reasons we have articulated elsewhere, we disagree with this view.217 T h e
important issue for now, however, is not necessity, but rather the legality of the
federalism understandings.
The most common legal argument made against the federalism
understandings is that they are inconsistent with the general liability of federal
nations under international law for the actions of their constituent states. This
principle is reflected in Article 50 of the ICCPR, which states that “[t]he
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal states
without any limitations or exceptions.” This argument is obviously not a
domestic constitutional argument. In any event, the argument is beside the
point because the federalism understandings do not purport to deny the liability
of the United States for the actions of its states. Rather, they simply note that,
because of the federal nature of the U.S. government, some of the treaty
obligations may be implemented at the state rather than federal level. As the
Bush Administration explained when it submitted a federalism understanding
to the Senate in connection with the ICCPR, “the intent is not to modify or
limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put our future treaty
partners on notice with regard to the implications of our federal system
concerning implementation.”218
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See Henkin, Bricker, supra note 4, at 345; Weissbrodt, supra note 4, at 66; see also
Damrosch, supra note 4, at 530-31 (arguing that non-self-execution declarations are not needed
to protect federalism).
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As one of us has explained elsewhere, commentators who view the federalism
understandings as unnecessary may be reading Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920),
more expansively than is warranted. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 425-26 (1998). Although the Court in Holland did suggest
that the treaty power was broader than Congress’s Article I powers, it did not hold that the
treaty power was immune from all federalism limitations. See 252 U.S. at 433-34 (“We do not
mean to imply that there are no qualifications as to the treaty-making power; but they must be
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Congress’s domestic legislative powers – developments that might alter the need for, and
desirability of, the Holland approach to the treaty power. This conclusion finds support in the
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the foreign affairs context. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding
Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 675 (1998).
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In a recent article, Professor Carlos Vazquez cleverly attempted to use
constitutional federalism concerns against the federalism understandings. As
he notes, the Supreme Court in recent years has held that the Tenth
Amendment bars the federal government from “commandeering” state
governments.219 Vazquez argues that if this anti-commandeering restriction
applies to the treaty power, it might be violated by the federalism
understandings.220 He observes that the United States has an international law
duty to implement its treaty obligations. “Thus,” he says, “the federalism
understanding, alongside the non-self-executing declaration appears to
commandeer state legislatures to pass the laws the treaty requires.”221
The obvious response to Vazquez is that the federalism understandings
are not intended to compel state action. These understandings, in other words,
are not designed to carry out an international law duty, but rather to make a
political statement about the federal nature of the U.S. system. As a Legal
Adviser to the State Department explained to the ICCPR’s Human Rights
Committee, the federalism understanding “is not a reservation and does not
affect [the United States’] international obligations under the Covenant, but
rather concerns the steps to be taken domestically by the respective federal and
state authorities.”222 Vazquez recognizes this possibility, but replies that “if the
purpose of the understanding is to make compliance with these treaties
ultimately a matter of the states’ option, then the resulting regime is in deep
tension with our constitutional scheme.”223 It is in deep tension with our
constitutional scheme, he says, because it allows for the possibility that some
state violations of treaties will not be prevented by the federal government.
Vazquez thus ultimately returns to the argument, discussed above, that the
Supremacy Clause is designed to reduce treaty violations. The historical
evidence, however, does not show that it was designed to reduce treaty
violations allowed by the federal government.224 By analogy, the dormant
Commerce Clause is designed to reduce state interference with interstate
commerce, but it does not preclude the federal government from authorizing

219

See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
220

See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1317 (1999); cf. Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 Const.
Commentary 33, 52 (1997) (noting possible tension between the anti-commandeering principle
and the federalism understandings in the RUDs).
221

Vazquez, Breard, supra note 220, at 1356.

222

Statement by Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to the
ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, USUN Press Release #49-(95) (March 29, 1995); see also
Stewart, supra note 82, at 1202.
223

Vazquez, Breard, supra note 220, at 1357-58.

224

See supra note 192.

Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent

51

such interference.225 In any event, Vazquez is wrong to assume that it is the
understandings that might make treaty compliance “a matter of the states’
option”; to the extent that anything has that effect, it is the federal structure of
the Constitution, and the understandings merely highlight that possibility.

V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CONDITIONAL CONSENT

We have tried to show why the United States’ RUDs practice is
consistent with both international law and U.S. constitutional law. Critics of
the RUDs, however, do not rely solely on legal arguments. Closely tied to
their legal objections is the view that the RUDs practice is, regardless of its
legality, bad policy. The policy criticisms are of two general types. The first
concerns the message that RUDs send to the international community. The
message, it is claimed, is that the United States does not take international
human rights law seriously.226 The second criticism concerns the effect this
message has on the international community. This effect is supposedly to
undermine international human rights protection.227
As we explain below, these criticisms are misplaced on several levels.
Perhaps most importantly, they fail to take account of the many virtues of the
RUDs practice. They also rest on a perfectionist view of international human
rights law, as well as an idealized view of domestic and international politics.
And, ironically, they might well do more harm than good with respect to U.S.
participation in international human rights law regimes and, because U.S.
participation appears so crucial, to the broader human rights movement itself.
A.

Virtues of the RUDs

Human rights treaties – and especially treaties like the ICCPR – have a
dual nature. They are in part law – a single legal text designed to establish
international obligations among all of the countries of the world. And they are
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in part aspirational – broad, universalistic norms designed to change national
and individual attitudes toward human rights in the face of substantial
variations in culture, political systems, moral commitments, and the like.
Given this dual nature, as well as the heterogeneity of the world community, it
is virtually impossible to reach agreement on a treaty text that is acceptable to
all nations. This is why, as the founders of the human rights movement
realized, conditional consent is so important. The practice mediates the legal
and aspirational natures of human rights treaties. It recognizes that nations of
the world are politically and culturally diverse, and makes it possible to reach
agreement on and movement toward general principles of human rights while
at the same time accommodating national differences.228
This mediating function has been particularly crucial for U.S.
participation in the international human rights movement. Since the Founding,
many segments of American society have ferociously resisted international
entanglements. Sometimes this resistance has been grounded in crass
xenophobia. Often, however, it has rested on more defensible grounds. One
such ground is a fundamental belief in self-government. This belief underlies
both a preference for local decisionmaking and a general concern about the
non-democratic and non-transparent ways in which much international law is
made. In addition, many Americans are understandably proud of the human
rights protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and reconstruction
Amendments, and the vigorous domestic judicial system that enforces them.
They worry that U.S. involvement in international human rights regimes might
threaten these domestic rights protections, as well as the liberties guaranteed
by separation of powers and federalism. A final ground for resisting
international entanglements is the belief that Americans can improve the lot of
humanity abroad not by active engagement in international and foreign affairs,
but rather by the excellence of its “example [as a] humane, democratic, and
prosperous society.”229
Whatever its source and motivation, U.S. resistance to international
entanglements has been an especially potent force in the twentieth century,
resulting in (among other things) the U.S. rejection of the Versailles treaty, the
228
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Bricker Amendment debates, and the forty-year refusal to ratify modern human
rights treaties.230 Against this background, the RUDs are an extraordinarily
important development. They helped break the logjam in domestic politics
that had prevented U.S. ratification of any of the major human rights treaties.231
And, contrary to conventional wisdom in the human rights community, they
did not do so in a way that rendered human rights commitments empty
promises. Even with the RUDs, the United States has bound itself to almost all
of the obligations in each of the four major human rights treaties it has ratified.
It has enacted domestic criminal, civil, and immigration laws to implement the
Genocide and Torture Conventions.232 Although the United States maintained
that its pre-treaty domestic laws satisfied its obligations under the ICCPR and
the Race Convention, it legally committed itself not to retreat from those laws.
Finally, pursuant to the treaties, the United States has opened its domestic
human rights practices to official international scrutiny by filing with
international bodies a number of reports that describe and defend U.S. human
rights practices.
In these and other ways, the United States has made genuine and
significant progress toward involvement in the international human rights
system. It is clear that these steps would not have been taken without the
RUDs as a condition for U.S. ratification. Almost as remarkable as the U.S.
evolution towards participation in international human rights regimes is the
consensus among U.S. policymakers concerning the wisdom of the RUDs
approach. RUDs have had the support of every President and the large
majority of every Senate since the United States began considering the modern
human rights treaties in the 1970s. This bipartisan and inter-branch agreement
is extraordinary when considered against the backdrop of the United States’
historical antagonism towards international human rights law. RUDs made
this possible.
With these points in mind, we now consider the specific policy
objections made against the RUDs.
B.

Message of the RUDs

One prominent criticism of the RUDs is that they send a message of
disrespect for international law in general, and international human rights law
in particular.233 We have just reiterated why U.S. human rights commitments
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under the treaties, even with the RUDs, are far from empty promises. It is
equally incorrect to say that the RUDs show disrespect for international law.
Consider first the U.S. reservations, which decline to consent to treaty
provisions that violate the U.S. Constitution or that are inconsistent with
widely-supported criminal justice practices. The decision by the United States
not to embrace these relatively few provisions does not constitute disrespect
for international law. Many nations, including the most progressive nations in
Western Europe, have similarly conditioned their consent to the treaties.234
While some nations have consented to the human rights treaties without
condition, there does not appear to be any correlation between these nations
(which include nations like Libya and Iraq) and respect for international human
rights law. As Arthur Rovine, a former Assistant Legal Adviser to the State
Department, has noted, “It is easy to sign a human rights treaty without any
reservations. Many authoritarian regimes have done so.”235
The central problem for international human rights law has not been
selective consent to treaty terms, but rather the failure by nations to adhere to
the treaty terms to which they have consented. The U.S. RUDs are expressly
designed to ensure that the United States does not consent to an international
obligation that it is unable, for constitutional or political reasons, to obey. One
can object that the United States has not assumed all of the obligations under
the human rights treaties, but it is wrong to conclude that the U.S. practice of
declining consent to a small number of human rights obligations shows
disrespect for international law. To the contrary, it is much more plausible to
conclude that the care with which the United States crafts its consent shows
respect for international law and an intention to comply with such law.236
We make these points without purporting to defend the U.S.
reservations, and the practices they immunize from international obligation, on
their moral merits. We do not believe that the reservations can all be easily
defended from this perspective, and, in any event, such a defense would
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require a different article. Briefly stated, the substantive reservations inspired
by free speech concerns, and the interpretive reservations defining the contours
of U.S. commitments concerning criminal procedure and discrimination, strike
us as the easiest to defend on moral grounds. The juvenile death penalty,
which has provoked international condemnation, and which is the touchstone
of so many complaints about U.S. human rights practices, strikes us as harder
to defend.
What is important for present purposes, however, is not our or any one
else’s views about the moral desirability of domestic laws enacted in a free and
democratic process. Whatever the moral desirability of the practice, the United
States shows no disrespect for international law in not abolishing it, for it has
steadfastly declined to consent to any such international law, either in a treaty
or by custom. The United States has, it is true, largely ignored international
disapprobation of the juvenile death penalty (and the death penalty more
generally), and it is certainly appropriate for nations (not to mention U.S.
citizens) that disagree with this practice to criticize the United States. Nothing
in our analysis takes issue with this. We insist only that being out of step with
the rest of the world is not, in itself, a reason for a nation to change its domestic
practices, and it certainly does not constitute disrespect for international law.
It is also incorrect to contend that the U.S. declaration of non-selfexecution shows disrespect for international law. Many nations require
implementing legislation before a treaty has domestic effect, and there is no
general obligation that a nation implement a treaty in any particular way.
Moreover, the United States is under no obligation to change its domestic law
after ratifying a human rights treaty if its law already satisfies the treaty
obligations. Under the terms of the ICCPR, for example, nations are required
to take steps to protect the rights under the treaty only if the rights are “not
already provided for by existing legislative or other measures.”237 The nonself-execution declarations therefore can be justified by the fact that the United
States already provides adequate domestic legal protections to fulfill its
international obligations.
This latter proposition – that U.S. domestic law satisfies U.S.
international human rights obligations – is open to debate. The reason it is
open to debate, however, only strengthens the case for the non-self-execution
declaration. It is open to debate because many human rights treaty terms are
couched in broad, open-ended terms. The resulting vagueness, combined with
the absence of an authoritative treaty interpreter, makes it difficult if not
impossible in many contexts to determine with certainty whether or not U.S.
domestic law satisfies its international obligations.
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Consider just a few of literally hundreds of possible examples from the
ICCPR. Can one say for sure that the absence of proportional representation in
the United States is consistent with the ICCPR’s “right of selfdetermination”?238 Is the Supreme Court’s rejection of L o c h n e r-style
economic rights consistent with the ICCPR’s guarantee of freedom “to
determine . . . economic development”?239 Are U.S. campaign finance laws
consistent with the international human right to “have access, on general terms
of equality, to public service”?240 Is the United States’ failure to prohibit
discrimination against overweight people, brown-eyed people, and Chicago
Cubs baseball fans consistent with its obligation to “prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as . . . status”?241
These questions, which can proliferate almost endlessly, show how
difficult it is to tell for sure whether the United States is complying with all the
terms of a human rights treaty. This point sheds light on the persistent
complaints that the United States is in widespread violation of the ICCPR.
One can indeed interpret the ICCPR’s terms to call into question scores of
domestic laws in the United States and many other western democracies. But
one can also easily read the ICCPR obligations as satisfied by current U.S.
domestic law. There is no authoritative international body to resolve this
“legal” disagreement; the ICCPR contemplates only that nations will open
their human rights practices for other nations to see and, if they like, criticize.
The United States is a liberal democracy with extraordinary, although not
perfect, statutory and constitutional human rights protections, and a federal
judiciary that has historically protected individual rights. Its human rights
protections come close enough to the line to conclude, with justification, that it
need not incur the extraordinary litigation and uncertainty costs of directly
incorporating these treaty terms into its domestic litigation system.
The U.S. preference for congressional rather than judicial monitoring of
the extent to which domestic law comports with international obligations has
an additional justification. Sometimes courts look to international bodies and
the writings of scholars in giving content to international obligations. The
ICCPR Human Rights Committee has no official interpretive authority over
the ICCPR, but as its recent Comments on treaty reservations indicate,242 the
Committee is not a body that views itself to be bound by consensus
international law principles. Unfortunately, this desire to achieve progressive
ends at the expense of broadly recognized international law principles also
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characterizes many academic writings about international human rights law.
Since these sources sometimes influence courts, it is understandable why the
treatymakers want to maintain political, as opposed to judicial, control of the
means of implementing the ICCPR’s open-ended obligations. Any other
course of action, at least in the U.S. tradition, would constitute a standardless
delegation of U.S. lawmaking power to federal courts and international bodies.
We should emphasize here that we are not suggesting that domestic law
perfectly protects human rights, either as written or, especially, as enforced.
But in the United States, anyway, international law is not the solution to these
problems. The solution is to work within U.S. democratic and constitutional
processes to effectuate change and improvement. The RUDs critics are
obsessed with international solutions to human rights problems. But this
obsession elevates form over substance. Sometimes internationalization of
human rights norms – defined as the delegation of human rights
responsibilities to a supra-national body – can help achieve domestic human
rights reform. This was so in Europe, where there was a post-World War II
desire for human rights improvement, but an absence of confidence in
domestic institutions to achieve these ends.243 What works for Europe,
however, will not necessarily work for the United States, which has a
significantly different political culture (especially in its attitude towards
international entanglements) and domestic human rights traditions. It was
extraordinary for the United States to assent to the general norms in the ICCPR
and to open its human rights practices to official international scrutiny. It does
not follow, however, that human rights progress in the United States is best
achieved by delegating the responsibility for determining the appropriate
content of human rights to bodies outside the United States.
C.

Effect of the RUDs

We now move from the meaning of the RUDs to their effect on the
international human rights movement. We have seen no empirical evidence to
support the claim that the RUDs practice undermines or threatens international
human rights law or the international human rights movement. And there is
much evidence to the contrary. The United States began ratifying modern
human rights treaties fifteen years ago, and it has attached RUDs to all of the
treaties. Yet during this same period international human rights law has, by
any measure, flourished.244 It is of course possible that the human rights
movement would have flourished even more in the absence of U.S. RUDs.
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But beyond vague and conclusory platitudes, the critics of the RUDs have not
explained how or why this is so.245
The claim that the U.S. RUDs practice harms the human rights
movement becomes even less convincing when one considers the many ways
that the United States influences human rights development around the world
outside the context of the human rights treaties. The United States exerts much
of its influence through the example of its own human rights standards, which
RUDs have not diminished at all. The United States is also the nation that
most aggressively enforces human rights standards in other countries – a
practice once again unaffected by the RUDs. More broadly, perhaps the
greatest advance for international human rights was the defeat of the Soviet
Union in the Cold War. The U.S. RUDs did not delay this victory. Indeed, the
RUDs were designed in part to increase U.S. participation in the international
human rights community in order to rebut Cold War propaganda about U.S.
human rights practices.246
These points indicate another error in the claim that the U.S. RUDs
harm international human rights law. These criticisms assume an inappropriate
baseline of comparison. They assume that compared to U.S. ratification
without R U D s , RUDs harm international human rights. This is an
inappropriate baseline of comparison because the RUDs were clearly a precondition to any U.S. ratification.247 The appropriate realistic question is
whether U.S. ratification with RUDs or no U.S. ratification whatsoever is
better for the international human rights movement. Viewed this way, it is
hard to say that the RUDs, which facilitate U.S. engagement in the
international human rights movement, harm the movement.
A related argument is that the RUDs undermine the United States’
ability to influence other nations’ human rights practices. The RUDs weaken
U.S. credibility on human rights issues, the argument goes, thereby
diminishing the effect of its moral pressure.248 Again, critics have presented no
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empirical evidence to support this proposition. Evidence to the contrary
includes the fact that most nations have not objected to the RUDs as well as the
fact that no nation has refused to enter into a treaty relationship with the United
States as a result of its RUDs. And when countries criticize U.S. credibility on
human rights, usually in response to human rights criticisms from the United
States, they do not attack the RUDs. Rather, they attack substantive practices
like discrimination, police abuse, and the like. 249 This suggests that the U.S.
RUDs are not the currency of moral complaint, at least not in political debates
between nations (as opposed to complaints from human rights activists).
We cannot, and do not, claim that the U.S. RUDs practice has no effect
whatsoever on international affairs. If nothing else, they probably feed the
suspicion in some circles that the United States is an arrogant superpower that
disdains international law. We have tried to show that the premise of this
complaint – that the U.S. RUDs practice shows disrespect for international law
– is much less warranted than conventional wisdom suggests. But perceptions
matter in international relations, and this perception, warranted or not, might
influence the international human rights movement. The RUDs critics have
not, however, explained how this influence occurs or its effect; nor have they
shown that any realistic alternative to the U.S. RUDs practice would be better
for the human rights movement.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The rise of human rights treaties has placed great demands on the
United States’ treatymaking process. The U.S. treatymakers face international
pressures to ratify human rights treaties and participate in international human
rights regimes. They also face significant domestic opposition to these treaties
grounded in a variety of factors ranging from concerns about altering domestic
constitutional lawmaking processes, to general satisfaction with the domestic
human rights law regime, to fear of international entanglement.
The RUDs are a reasonable and largely successful response to these
competing pressures. They have allowed the United States to make genuine
international human rights commitments, and to participate fully in debates
about, and development of, international human rights law. They also have
opened up U.S. human rights practices to official international scrutiny. These
are extraordinary advances for a nation that has instinctively, and sometimes
vehemently, resisted the relinquishment of its sovereignty to international law
and institutions.
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At the same time, the RUDs protect a range of domestic prerogatives.
They ensure that the United States does not make international legal
commitments that it cannot fulfill for domestic constitutional or political
reasons. They leave the concrete implementation of vague human rights
commitments to the federal political branches rather than the federal courts.
They also help preserve Congress’s traditional role in enacting domestic
human rights protections, as well as the states’ traditional role in regulating
local matters. As we hope to have shown, the RUDs achieve these many ends
consistent with both international law and U.S. constitutional law.
In light of these points, it might seem surprising that the legal academy
and the international human rights community are so uniformly opposed to the
RUDs. Their opposition to the RUDs, however, is simply one example of the
idealistic and perfectionist orientation of these groups – an orientation that
tends to overvalue the role of international institutions and undervalue
domestic political and structural concerns. Although idealism has its place in
human rights advocacy, the stridency, exaggeration, and impatience that
characterize the opposition to the RUDs threatens to make U.S. officials less
inclined, not more inclined, to continue their involvement with international
institutions. In this respect, as with so many other international human rights
issues, the perfect becomes the enemy of the good, and aspiration becomes the
enemy of the law.

